

Revising the Value Shift Hypothesis: A descriptive Analysis of South Africa's Value Priorities between 1990 and 2001.

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Since 1990 South Africa has been characterized by intense restructuring in the political, social, cultural and economic sphere, and this monumental transformation has had a multifarious impact on South African society. Much of this impact and the resultant changes have been assessed in recent academic and political debate, yet there has been little extensive and systematic research to assess the direction, magnitude and nature of these changing dynamics of South Africa's values. Although the World Values Survey (WVS) has proven invaluable for research in this field of mass public values, most of the research has been fashioned in a manner to tap values in industrialized and western states, arguably rendering some aspects of the theoretical models of explanation less relevant for developing nations. This article therefore aims to advance an understanding of value change within the South African context, particularly in light of the expansive political, social and economic changes to have transpired since 1990, whilst simultaneously proposing one possibility of an expansion to the model currently used to measure value change. The aim of this study is to determine whether South African value priorities are changing, and, if so, what is the direction and magnitude of this change. The change will be measured in terms of the materialist/post-materialist dimension between 1991 and 2001, and a separate pre-materialist/materialist continuum, between 1995 and 2001, after which a comparison will be drawn to determine which dimension proves more pertinent.

On the grounds of the socio-economic and historical context of South Africa, it can be hypothesized that the pre-materialist/materialist continuum offered will prove more applicable than the original Inglehart materialist/post-materialist dimension, rendering it a better instrument for the measurement and consequent analysis of South Africa's and potentially other developing countries' values. The more relevant measurement scale will then be utilized to determine whether value change has occurred, and the results will be extrapolated. Ideally this article would then follow with an extensive comparison of values amongst the various population sub-groups, to show whether the divisions of South African society are reflected in its values, but unfortunately only one division in South African society will be focused upon.

Questions to be addressed are therefore: What does South Africa's value dimension look like? What have been the most pervasive changes in public values? What are possible explanations for these changes? What are the implications of the dynamics of this value change for the present? In which way will these implications influence South Africa future? The principal significance of the article lies in starting to fill a knowledge gap concerning the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of value change within South Africa, as well as testing an alternative model for value measurement in developing countries.

The capacity of this article should not, however, be overestimated. It should simply be seen as one step in the process of understanding the jigsaw of South African values, as well as the extending of a largely western-industrialized nation model to greater universal applicability and use. This article is therefore also significant in that it attempts to formalize the first few steps taken towards an expansion of a potentially relevant and insightful theory to incorporate most of the developing world.

Socio-Economic and Political Background

Before the results of the 1990, 1995 and 2001 WVS can be compared, it is crucial that the differing backdrops against which the three surveys were conducted be examined. This measurement and comparison of socio-economic and political settings is imperative to establish a context in which to analyze the changes in South Africa's value dimension. To achieve this a framework of indicators of the most pervasive external changes has been selected.

The 1991 South African World Values Survey was conducted on the very eve of nationwide transition. The international community had imposed formal sanctions since 1988, and President PW Botha had been succeeded by FW De Klerk, whilst Nelson Mandela had been released from Prison after serving 27 years.

Although change appeared imminent, there was great uncertainty and much apprehension.¹ The October 1995 WVS, although conducted in the post-Apartheid era, took place a mere 18 months after the first democratic elections. Most South Africans were still trying to internalize the expansive changes to have occurred within the country over the last five years. Although many of the broad political changes had been enacted, many South Africans were still awaiting the implications of these on the broader socio-economic environment. Uncertainty for the future loomed.² Since then much has changed. A relatively peaceful transition has occurred and South Africa has held its second democratic elections in June 1999. The euphoria of the first elections has subsided. Economically and socially a certain degree of consolidation has occurred and much of the uncertainty has dissipated. A completely different political milieu has been entered into with the African National Congress (ANC) almost attaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament.³ It is thus necessary to determine South Africa's value structure in this new environment. The different context against which the 2001 World Values Survey was conducted will no doubt be reflected in the results of the survey.

In terms of the economy, the last decade has revealed a mixed bag of changes. With regard to macro-economic policy, there has been a shift from the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), with its emphasis on growth through reconstruction, to the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy, with a greater emphasis on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, increased job creation, lower inflation, increased non-gold exports, increased inflows of foreign investment and a rise in domestic savings (Adelzadeh, 1999:3). This change in macro-economic policy has been accompanied by a relatively dismal growth rate, a comparatively low GDP per capita and⁴ increasing levels of unemployment.⁵ Escalating unemployment clearly become one of the biggest problems facing the country. Another leading challenge facing South Africa is its gross income inequality, with a recent report ranking South Africa as the country with the most skewed income distribution, second only to Brazil (*Mail and Guardian*, 28 July 2000).

Although financial indicators are important, the significance of economic development levels should not be underestimated. In 1995 South Africa ranked 86th on the Human Development Index (HDI), whilst in 2000 South Africa ranked 103rd (Human Development Report, 2000). Despite this apparent drop in standards of living, the quality of life of many South Africans has improved through the provision of free or affordable basic goods and services, examples of which include the provision of water, electricity and shelter. The provision of health care and education have revealed both progress and deterioration (*Cape Argus*, 31 March 2001; *Mail & Guardian*, 21 January 1999).

The Inglehart Model

The end product of a number of years of research by, amongst others Ronald Inglehart, was the construction of two indexes to classify 12 items into underlying materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977: 40). Inglehart's theoretical justification of classification along this values continuum was partially founded on Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1954),⁶ which states that there is a specific direction in which the change of needs will move, given a set of definite conditions. Employing the complimentary and interdependent hypotheses of *scarcity* and *socialization*,⁷ he asserted that when one category of needs had been fulfilled the next hierarchical category would take precedence. Consequently, in societies where conditions of physical and economic security become more consolidated, "a potentially universal process should occur" (Inglehart, 1995:6), a process that results in the ever greater prevalence of post-materialists in many industrialized nations (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). The *socialization* hypothesis has since been recast into a mould of 'formative security' (Inglehart, 1990:121-124). Inglehart's hypotheses have not, however, gone without criticism,⁸ but this article will attempt to discuss one possibility of how this model can be amended for greater relevance in the measurement of the values of industrializing nations.

The South African Three Index Model

As already mentioned, the locus of most of the research conducted by Inglehart and his colleagues has been the industrialized world. Although some recent adaptations have allowed, to a limited degree, for the developing world to be included in the research (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:11), a classification that only allows for a materialist/post-materialist dimension does not prove very relevant for most of the developing world, where basic survival needs are often not even met. The South African World Values Survey executed in 1995 and 2001 include a battery containing the 12 original items, as well as the 18 different options of national priorities, a new and unique addition being the inclusion of 6 items that are concerned with basic survival needs. The pre-materialist items are as follows: *“Providing shelter for all People”*; *“Providing clean water for all people”*; *“Making sure that everyone is adequately clothed”*; *“Making sure that everyone can go to school”*; *“Providing land for all people”*; *“Providing everyone with enough food to eat”*.

The inclusion of the six extra items by the principle investigators of the 1995 WVS, which allow for the adding of the so-called pre-materialist dimension can be justified on the grounds of “the complexity and diversity of the South African population as far as values are concerned and the extent that poverty is affecting value orientations” (Lategan, 2000: 410). The inadequacy of a dimension without a pre-materialist index does not, however, simply rest with the fact that some fundamental needs are not represented by the existing items, but that certain post-materialist items are wrongly interpreted to express certain pre-materialist or materialist needs, thereby skewing the results towards increased post-materialism, when this is not the case. One example is the item regarding *“giving people more say in their work and in their community”*, which can be wrongly interpreted as pertaining to the employment situation and could in fact be focusing on such materialist needs as greater job security. The questionnaires for 1995 and 2001 have also replaced the item regarding ‘maintaining a stable economy’ with one pertaining to employment levels, possibly due to increasing levels of unemployment already proving themselves a potential problem to the principal investigators of the 1995 leg of the WVS.⁹

Research Design


The study utilizes existing attitudinal data obtained from the World Values Survey for the years 1991, 1995 and 2001.¹⁰ Although a longer time period would have been preferable, data of the original 12-item model only spans 10 years, whilst data for the 18-item model only spans 5. The questionnaire was offered in a number of indigenous languages. The sample sizes were approximately 3 000 in all three legs, and were drawn from all inhabitants of South Africa over the age of 16, by a process of stratifying the entire population into four groupings, namely by province, gender, population group and community size.

During data analysis various statistical procedures were utilized to monitor and analyze the nature of the value priorities of the South African population according to the two dimensions, in order to ascertain which measure is most relevant in a South African context. A comparison of the results will entail analyzing the impact of the addition of a pre-materialist index on the distribution of value priorities, thereby revealing a possible alternative to the standard model. This will be followed by an analysis to ascertain the direction and degree of the change to have transpired over the specified period of time, also involving a speculative-empirical analysis to determine the causes of value change in South Africa.

The Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

Chart 1 depicts the location of the South African population along the original dimension first proposed by Inglehart in 1973. (See Appendix A for information on the construction of the indexes.) The chart can be interpreted in terms of a score of -10 and 10, denoting a 'highly polarised' materialist or post-materialist types, with scores of between -2 and 2 denoting neutral or 'mixed' types, who express both materialist and post-materialist values in roughly equal proportions. Those scoring between 4 and 8 (or -4 and -8) can be thought of as mixed types with greater emphasis on either materialist or post-materialist needs. From chart 1 it becomes clear that there has been very little shift in the portion of pure materialists and pure post-materialist between 1990 and 2001, whilst a substantial increase in the number of mixed typed materialists (i.e. those scoring -6 and -8) is discernible.

Chart 1: Scores on the Materialist/Post-materialist Continuum




The increasing prioritization of one type of value is inevitably linked to a decrease in the prioritization of another, whereby the increased prioritization of materialist values is paralleled with an overall reduction of respondents on the more neutral and post-materialist side of the scale. Any further analysis of the data in the format of the materialist/post-materialist dimension shall be foregone in favor of analysis according to the pre-materialist/materialist dimension, primarily on the grounds of the previously described socio-economic situation in the country.

The Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension

Chart 2 portrays the value orientations of the South African population between 1995 and 2001. Overall there is a higher portion of respondents that prioritize pre-materialist needs in 1995, than in 2001, and this situation appears to be compensated for by the large percentage of respondents with weak to medium materialist underpinnings in 2001.

Chart 2: Scores on the Pre-materialist/Materialist Continuum



Taken as a whole, there does appear to be a trend of slight increase in the emphasis on materialist, as opposed to pre-materialist, needs over the last five years. The overall decrease, albeit a slight one, in pre-materialists of varying polarizations, could be attributed to a number of factors.

Although the classic political behaviour debate of ‘affect’ versus ‘cognition’ in the formulation of judgments has been noted, this article will be built on the premise that most people rely on both ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’¹¹ in the making of decisions, and will therefore, utilize at least some objective facts in the processing and substantiating of their opinions. In the following sections various potential paths of

reasoning will be extrapolated, and examples of corroborative information, that people could have utilized, provided.

The first plausible rationale involves a general perception that the basic survival needs of the people are being catered for, rendering the provision of basic needs a progressively less pre-occupying need. There is a multitude of plausible reasons for this change. The most obvious reasoning would entail a real improvement in state delivery of basic services and infrastructure. A workable economic platform was put in place, need assessments were conducted, target policies drafted and finances, according to some to the tune of approximately R100 billion made available (*Indicator SA*, 2000:80). This alone could go some distance to explaining why pre-materialist needs reveal a declining prioritization. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981:129-161) asserted that people make electoral decisions on socio-tropic assessment, and this argument could be transported to the assessment of general conditions. People not in need of state provision of these goods and services, could be lead to believe that once these previously mentioned steps have been taken, the issue has been sufficiently addressed.

If one speculates that most citizens, even those not in direct contact, are more critical, relying on results and not promises to make judgments, there is indeed sufficient evidence to suggest that primary needs are increasingly being met, once again allowing for other values to be prioritized. A recent report in *Indicator SA*, which monitored infrastructure delivery, revealed that in some areas the delivery of social services has improved dramatically. Examples include the approximately one million housing subsidies that have been granted, the improvements made in terms of the provision, access and equity of education, the large number of clinics that have been built, as well as the progress in water delivery (Education: Achieving..., 2000:78).

Statistics quoted in Moller (2000:22), portray how South Africans feel in terms of whether they have perceived a change for the better in their lives since 1994. The fact that four of the top five fields in which

South Africans perceived the most pronounced changes for the better, represent basic survival needs (housing, electricity, health care, education), would imply that a large portion of South Africans feel that their basic needs are being fulfilled to greater satisfaction now, than was the case 6 years ago. The perception of improvements in other fields, such as the creation of jobs or increased crime prevention, is far smaller, leaving much room for these types of needs to be prioritized. According to a recent longitudinal study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), dissatisfaction with, amongst others educational opportunities, health care and standard of living, has declined for Blacks, while Whites, Coloureds and Indians have shown increasing levels of dissatisfaction. The end status is, however, that with regard to the seven facets under investigation, people as a whole were more satisfied in the year 2000, than they were in 1994 (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 2001:48-54).

Another plausible argument to explain the apparent public perception of basic needs having been better met in 2001 than in 1995, could be that, although social service delivery may not have improved, people have greater access to the services and infrastructure provided by the state. Very often it is insufficient to simply look at the statistics, one actually needs to look at the accessibility and distribution of the resources. It is possible that these resources have become increasingly accessible over time, leading to this decrease in the prioritization in pre-materialist values. Particularly in the field of water and electricity provision, more effort has been made to reach the poor, rural and disenfranchised. More than 1.3 million rural people now have access to clean water within 200 metres of their house, and over 1.5 million houses have been electrified (*Indicator SA*, 2000:79). The fact that women and children, two of the sectors of society most disadvantaged in the past and most in need at present, are the only ones given free health could further substantiate the perception that basic needs are being better met.

An alternative explanation is based on a more even distribution of basic social services and infrastructure, independent of the increasing income inequality gap. This would mean that although people do not have more income available, they have experienced a higher standard of living due to benefits handed out in

kind and not in cash. Examples include free education (Van Den Berg, 2000, quoted in Natrass and Seekings, 2001:56) free health care to pregnant women and children under the age of 6, as well as food stamps or producer subsidies (*Indicator SA*, 2000:82). This situation would be further augmented by the fact that the higher income groups pay more tax than they receive social delivery goods or services, whether in cash or kind, whilst the opposite is true for the poorest categories, whose benefits greatly exceeded the amounts of tax they pay (Natrass and Seekings, 2001:56).

Consequently, it would appear that there is a wealth of statistics to substantiate the perception that perfunctory survival needs are being increasingly met. There is, however, just as large an amount of literature and statistics that all but prove the exact opposite.¹² The argument of more equal access to social services is disputed by indications such as the situation where the main beneficiaries of a reformed housing policy were the urban poor, with the rural poor being largely excluded from the process, leaving many worse off than at the outset (Natrass and Seekings, 2001:59). Another case in point is the provision of non-grid electricity, which does not allow for the use of electric stoves, which means that women, who are largely responsible for the cooking, still do not benefit from this service (Hassen, 2000:15), and will therefore not consider their needs better met.

Critical citizens could easily find a host of information substantiating the notion that increasing financial and personnel allocation does not guarantee a better output of social services and goods. More money having been spent on schools, children nutrition schemes and housing subsidies, does not ensure that people received the goods and services. Some of the reasons for this include implementation problems and corruption. A case in point would be the large number of rural clinics that have been built since 1994, of which many have suddenly had to contend with 30% staff cuts (*The Mail & Guardian*, 6 February 1998). Further, many people may have originally received access to resources, but due to a lack of maintenance and proper upkeep, only experienced the spoils for a short while. An example here would be the more than

50% of water faucets that have been broken since the implementation of the thousands of communal taps since 1994 (Bond, 2000:18).

The decline of the prioritization of pre-materialist needs could, however, also be based on completely different notions, one possibility being that poor and needy people are increasingly looking to other sources for the provision of basic needs, and finding them there. Superior social networks facilitating community and family delivery of perfunctory goods and services is simply one example. Statistics regarding this would be near impossible to attain, but one could argue that extended family networks are becoming increasingly important as people opt out of the system of relying on the state. Other non-state actors, such as NGOs, churches, community and foreign aid organizations could be fulfilling the needs of people more successfully now than in 1995. An example in this instance would be some of the houses that have been built by women's self-help groups, in conjunction with *stokvels*, or the Protea scheme, which is helped by an NGO called the South African Homeless People's Federation, which builds houses with the use of second hand materials, collective labour and finances them with moneys made available by the rotation of financial assets (*The Star*, 25 February 1998). People could however, increasingly be opting for the private provision of goods, as is being seen in the increasing reliance on the provision of private security and health care.¹³ Here, once again, aggregate statistics (if any could be unearthed), would not be truly representative of the real situation, and consequently the argument that people are increasingly seeing their primary needs met by non-state sources, must remain simply speculative.

A different plausible route is to reconceptualize why pre-materialist values would be deemed less important, and three conceivable arguments shall be examined. The first scenario asserts that the de-prioritization of pre-materialist needs could be due to excessive and ever-escalating levels of crime and unemployment, coupled with the perceptions that the state is performing worse in these fields than in others. This scenario could mean that South Africans are increasingly prioritizing the items regarding the fighting of crime and on the economic security side, the item dealing with employment, to such a degree

as to skew the results. Thus although the respondents would score very low on the other materialist items, the scores on these two are very high, thereby falsely designating people as materialists instead of the pre-materialists that they truly are. Hence, although primary needs may be far from adequately met, the unnaturally high levels of crime results in pre-materialists selecting this item, rather than important pre-materialist items in the battery. Although crime levels are very high by international standards, crime has become an even more critical issue as a consequence of the framing it has undergone. The electronic media in particular, has been largely guilty of sensationalizing violent crimes to increased viewer figures, whilst the national government has increasingly framed crime as one of the potentially biggest obstacles to democratic consolidation (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:253). Various political parties and media sources, have utilized crime to realize political agendas and maintain specific support bases, in terms of White conservative parties framing white farmers as under constant fatal threat from black criminals. A testing of this argument could yield very interesting results, and could be done in much the same format as the experimental research conducted by Clarke and Dutt (1991:905), in which the perceived shift towards post-materialism observed by Inglehart and his colleagues, was in fact, unsubstantiated if a question on employment was inserted to replace one of the questions in the original battery. By replacing the item regarding crime or unemployment with other items, such as reducing the income inequality (if the economic security item is left out), or improving the criminal justice system (if the physical security item is left out), more real results could possibly be computed. For the moment we will simply have to bear in mind that this possibility exists, and thus the results may not necessarily be as representative of real value underpinnings as expected due to measurement error.

Based upon the same premise, namely that materialist values are not being prioritized on the grounds of pre-materialist needs having been more satisfactorily met, the second alternative concerns another possible measurement error. The specific phrasing of the question asked of respondents could be less than reliable in testing underlying value priorities, and more adequate at testing people's evaluations of which parts of government policy are still inadequate, requiring more work. The exact wording of the question is as follows: "People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On

this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?" It is possible that people could interpret this question, not in terms of what the national needs are, but in terms of the weaknesses in government policy. The statistics regarding people's perceptions of the most prominent changes, quoted previously, highlights those fields in which people have seen a marked improvement. There is only one materialist item listed, with 5% of South Africans feeling that there has been an increase in the provision of jobs and job prospects (Moller, 2000:22). Thus it would seem that most South Africans feel that the government has focused to a greater extent (and with much more success), on items of pre-materialist foundation, than on items of materialist underpinning. Hence they could rationalize that these 'materialist' items need to be accorded more attention in the future, despite pre-materialist needs largely still inadequately met.

Another alternative could be that South Africans are undergoing a conceptual overhaul, a mind shift exemplified by the move from the RDP to GEAR. This would entail that people no longer think in the order of needs as postulated by Maslow (1954), whereby the fulfillment of basic survival needs is a prerequisite for the prioritization of security needs. It is possible that South Africans are increasingly re-organizing their needs, whereby the *modus operandi* to fulfilling basic survival needs is to have economic and physical security and safety. High levels of economic growth, low inflation and full employment may thus be prioritized ahead of items such as the provision of food, clothing, land and water, as people could rationalize that these can be bought, once money has been earned. The item regarding shelter, and to a greater degree that regarding education, will probably be exceptions, making it no surprise that these are the two most mentioned pre-materialist items.

Shelter could represent an exception because such large portions of South Africans are still without a shelter fit for human habitation. Another reason could be that this item may also have certain post-materialist and materialist underpinnings. Many South Africans lay great emotional claim to owning their own homes, a conviction conceivably amplified by the forced removals under the Apartheid government.

The positive self-reinforcement experienced when owning your own home is not easily paralleled, and therefore the item regarding shelter could cater to post-materialist needs for some. Further, the item may reveal materialist values, in terms of the ownership of a home representing some kind of financial stability, in terms of it being a costly commodity, which can be sold if large debts were to be incurred, as well as it functioning as collateral when applying for loans. The item regarding schooling may also be an exception because a solid education may be perceived as the ticket to employment, bringing with it financial security. Consequently South Africans could be prioritizing economic security needs in a value trade-off between present and future gain. People could be willing to compromise on the prioritization of certain pre-materialist needs on the grounds that these will be automatically met, if economic stability and prosperity has been established.

It becomes clear that there are a multitude of motivations for the visible decrease in the emphasis of pre-materialist values, in favor of low-polarized materialist items. Different respondents will employ various motivations, often no doubt in interaction with each other, to come to the conclusions demonstrated in the results. Most probably it is the dynamics of the dual effects of decreasing pre-materialism and increasing materialism that can be held liable for these findings. The fact that most of the increase is experienced amongst the least-polarized materialists (those scoring 2) highlights the fact that the results have been altered by just one or two fewer pre-materialist and one or two more materialist items being selecting in 2001 than in 1995. Thus it would seem that this change is very short-term, and that the orientations in the South African case are still very fluid, and far from any kind of crystallization.

The Disaggregated Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension

The value change discussed above may not, however, be representative of the value fluidity of all the population sub-groups in South Africa's highly heterogeneous population. As mentioned, it is impossible to discuss the value change in each separate socio-economic and demographic groups, and hence the essay will focus on the four main racial groups (see charts 3 and 4), although this research also measured value

change in the population as disaggregated according to education, income, age and gender. Amongst the black population the strong and weak pre-materialists-, as well as mixed and weak materialist types, have experienced a decrease since 1995, the weak materialist types have displayed an increase over the same period of time. Plausible causes of this increasing coalescing around the weak materialist pole have already been speculated upon previously, and will therefore not be addressed in great detail. Suffice to say that it is probably the dual interaction of increasing emphasis being laid on physical security needs, with Africans being the primary victims of crime (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:243) and the possibility of perfunctory survival needs having been better met.

Chart 3: Value-type Distribution according to Race: 1995.





Chart 4: Value-type Distribution according to Race: 2001.



A slightly divergent pattern is visible in the Coloured groups, who, whilst displaying a slight decrease in strong pre-materialist types, reveal a slight upsurge in all three the weak pre-materialist, mixed and weak materialist types. They also reveal a marked decline in the portion strong materialists. Coloured people therefore seem to be exhibiting this trend of escalating convergence around the middle-of-the-range value types to a far greater extent than Blacks. A strikingly different trend is visible amongst Indians. The visible decline in weak and strong pre-materialists appears offset by an increase in mixed types. This picture appears replicated once again, by a drop in weak materialists being compensated for by an increase amongst strongly polarized materialists.


The White group, however, portrays a scenario unlike that of any of the other groups, starting with a marginal increase in both the strong and weak pre-materialists. No longer protected by a favorable Apartheid state and having to content with affirmative action policies, Whites people are increasingly feeling the pinch. Together with the situation of greater integration since 1994 having dispelled some of the ignorance of the poverty stricken situation amongst other, largely non-white, groups, Whites could be more aware of pre-materialist needs of the country as a whole. The largest determinants in terms of the increase in pre-materialists is probably, however, the increasingly experienced threat to white ownership

of land and White pre-occupation with the perceived deterioration of the national education system. This increase in pre-materialists must then be offset by a decrease elsewhere. Despite the much lauded emphasis on security needs amongst the white population, the greater prioritization of the previously mentioned pre-materialist needs outstrips this concern with security, resulting in a situation where a value trade-off reveals a decrease in materialists amongst the white population.

The 18-item Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

The pre-materialist/materialist dimension having been exhaustively examined, it is now necessary to return to a speculative analysis of the population located on the 18-item materialist/post-materialist spectrum. In the first section of the analysis, in which the population was situated on the original Inglehart materialist/post-materialist dimension, it was revealed that only a very small portion of South Africans actually prioritizes post-materialist values. It has, subsequently, been concluded that the batteries containing the pre-materialist items represent an improved method of tapping underlying value structures. For this reason it is imperative that the movement along the materialist/post-materialist dimension of this model, as opposed to the original Inglehart model, be evaluated. Right from the outset of the analysis of chart 5, it is quite clear that there has only been marginal change in terms of this dimension over the last five years. The orientation of the population along the materialist/post-materialist dimension reveals little change, with only very slight deviations at some points. Due to the results of the analysis of the Inglehart materialist/post-materialist dimension, a very even distribution about the median was not expected, but these only serve to reinforce the reduced applicability and relevance of the materialist/post-materialist continuum.

Chart 5: Scores on the Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension



South Africa does not, however, appear to be moving away from post-materialist to materialist prioritization, as the greater coalescing around the materialist pole is largely determined by a decreasing emphasis on pre-materialist values. Hence it would seem that the primary location of value trade-offs appear to be the interface between pre-materialist and materialist values, with post-materialist values simply remaining quite irrelevant. Table 1 demonstrates the fact that there is no overall increase in post-materialists, but that a slight increase in the prioritization of separate materialist items, accompanied by a slight decrease in the prioritization of post-materialist items, resulted in a situation of a 2% decrease amongst the mixed types. The possible reasons for an increased prioritization of materialist needs have been expanded upon during the analysis section, and will not be addressed again.

Table 1: Percentage Change in Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

	1995	2001
Materialists	81.5	83.5
Materialist/Post-materialist Mixed Types	7.5	5.8
Post-materialists	10.5	10.5

In terms of the post-materialist values, the Apartheid government having being replaced by a democratic one, could catalyze a subconscious decline in the perceptual importance of certain post-materialist needs. This move could have brought about the perception that the abolition of repressive Apartheid laws, the inception of an electoral liberal democracy and an exemplary constitution, makes it unnecessary to pre-occupy oneself with a number of the post-materialist items, such as the freedom of speech and more say in important government decisions. With the change in institutional and legal structure, and many protective measures enshrining and guaranteeing many important rights and freedoms, these items may be receiving less attention. Speculation of the possible reasons aside, the value shift hypothesis- entailing a redistribution of values towards increased post-materialism, is definitely not observable in the South African context, with post-materialist values remaining rather marginal in the bigger picture of South Africa's value orientation.

Are South Africa's Values Changing?

Despite the absence of a shift towards increased post-materialism, South Africa's values appear to be undergoing a slight reorganization along the pre-materialist/materialist dimension. This value movement has, however, not been as large as might have been expected, in light of the massive restructuring that has occurred within the country over the period under review.

Table 2: Percentage Change in the Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension

	1995	2001
Pre-materialists	30.1	24.6
Pre-materialist/Materialist Mixed Types	36.2	40.9
Materialists	33.4	34.3

A superficial observation of the end statistics provided in table 2, could result in deductions that South Africa's values are not undergoing systematic change. Conclusions of such a nature could be arrived at, as the largest visible change entails a decrease in pre-materialists, in conjunction with an approximately equal increase amongst mixed types, denoting a moderation in polarization, and not a 'real' change, with the percentage increase in materialists being a marginal 1.1%. Such an interpretation would, however, not be reflective of the real extent of movement occurring within various sub-groups of the population. South Africa's values are therefore undergoing relatively dramatic fluctuations, mainly reflected when the data are disaggregated for the various population sub-groups, despite the end results not always reflecting this. There does, however, appear to be a decrease in pre-materialism, with an ever so slight increase in the portion of materialists, with levels of post-materialism remaining unchanged, and still relatively insignificant. On the whole a process of incrementally more convergent value orientation becomes apparent. Whilst very few isolated groups display an increasing polarization towards the extremes, the majority is increasingly representing middle-of-the-range alternatives, with an ever-increasing portion prioritizing both materialist and pre-materialist values. Further, value change appears to be undergoing a plethora of fluctuations within the various population sub-groups, indicating that the short-term value priorities of most South Africans are in no way crystallized, but are likely to undergo further change.

The Appropriateness of the Three-Index Model

Most of these findings and consequent deductions would not have been possible without the introduction of the pre-materialist index. The original materialist-post-materialist dimension proved inappropriate in tapping South Africa's true value orientations, primarily because the interface of value change in South Africa is located within the pre-materialist/materialist dimension, with the importance of post-materialist values remaining marginal. The inclusion of pre-materialist items in two successive waves of the South African WVS, proved to be a crucial element in attaining a true portrayal of South Africa's value orientations, creating the possibility that a revised model may also prove more applicable for other developing countries. The drawing of any decisive conclusions, regarding the universally greater appropriateness of this amended model, would have to be preceded with applications to the data of other African, developing and even industrialized nations.

Conclusion

In conclusion one can assert that the expansive external political, social and economic changes to have transpired since 1990 and 1995 respectively, have brought about internal fluidity in the value dimension of South Africa as a whole, as well as for the various population sub-groups individually. The assertion made by Rescher (1969:118), that the "change in the operational sphere- in the whole range of social, cultural, demographic, economic, and technological factors that comprise the way of life in that society- has enormous repercussions for values- providing tremendous opportunities for the enhancement of some of our traditional ideals and aspirations, and great threats to the realization of other," appears validated. As predicted the value shift hypothesis promulgated by Inglehart appears largely uncorroborated, whilst an overall trend away from pre-materialism towards increased mixed type value priorities, with a slight increase in materialists, has become evident.

In the process of this analysis, the article has also begun to situate a global, but still largely Western theory, in a South African and developing world context, denoting a small step towards expanding knowledge regarding the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of universal value priorities. The opportunity for further advancement of this knowledge could thus be presenting itself in the form of the development of an expanded conceptual framework that demonstrates greater applicability to the socio-economic and cultural reality of South Africa, Africa, and much of the developing world.

Appendix 1

Table 3 demonstrates the factor loadings of the uniquely South African 18-item model in 1995. Most of the loadings appear acceptably high, with the item regarding keeping the countryside beautiful even loading in this application of the 18-item model. The only problem appears to be the item regarding employment, which loads onto the component which houses all the post-materialist items, but doing so with a negative prefix.

**Table 3: Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis of
18-item Model: 1995¹⁴**

	Component 1	Component 2
<i>Providing Shelter for all People</i>	0.52	
<i>Making sure that Everyone is adequately clothed</i>	0.47	
<i>Providing clean Water for all People</i>	0.45	
<i>Making sure that Everyone can go to School</i>	0.38	
<i>Providing Land for all People</i>	0.36	
<i>Providing enough Food for all People</i>	0.33	
Maintaining Law and Order	-0.66	
Maintaining a high Rate of Economic Growth	-0.55	
Fighting Crime	-0.50	
Maintaining a strong Defence Force	-0.29	
Fighting Rising Prices	-0.26	
Making sure all People are fully employed		-0.74
Keeping the Countryside beautiful		0.42
Protecting Freedom of Speech		0.34
A Society where Ideas count more		0.28
More say at Work and in their Communities		0.25
A more Humane and less Impersonal society		0.19
More say in Government Decisions		0.15

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

**Table 4: Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis of
18-item Model: 2001**

	Component 1	Component 2 ¹⁵
<i>Providing Shelter for all People</i>	0.69	
<i>Providing Land for all People</i>	0.46	
<i>Providing clean Water for all People</i>	0.30	
<i>Making sure that Everyone is adequately clothed</i>	0.28	
<i>Providing enough Food for all People</i>	0.18	
<i>Making sure that Everyone can go to School</i>	0.12	
Fighting Crime	-0.69	
Maintaining Law and Order	-0.59	
Fighting Rising Prices	-0.36	
Maintaining a high Rate of Economic Growth	-0.26	
Maintaining a strong Defence Force	-0.24	
Making sure all People are fully employed	0.21	-0.76
More say in Government Decisions		0.54
More say at Work and in their Communities		0.53

A more Humane and less Impersonal society	0.34
A Society where Ideas count more	0.31
Protecting Freedom of Speech	0.19
Keeping the Countryside beautiful	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

The table of 2001 factor loadings (table 4) reveals predictable results, except, once again in the case of the item regarding "unemployment". In both data sets the item regarding unemployment appears to simultaneously encompass pre-materialist, materialist and post-materialist needs. One could speculate that in the South African mindset, having a job is cognitized as a basic survival need, primarily because without the means of income derived from employment, most of the other basic needs will not be met, thus involving an almost direct link. The item will, of course, represent materialist needs to some degree, in terms of being included in the group of financial and economic factors, which, both on an individual and national level, affect economic security. Unemployment may, however, also entail certain post-materialist underpinnings, by means of the psychologically damaging effects of unemployment, an example of which would include the loss of feelings of self-worth as a result of being unemployed. Although this somewhat complex item appears to reveal a host of underlying values, for the purpose of the continuity of the analysis, it will still be included in the materialist index.

The theoretical and empirical validity and reliability sufficiently expanded upon, the indexes can be constructed. In both the 12-item and the 18-item model the indexes were created in much the same way. The construction of the index began by adding all the respective materialist and respective post-materialist items together. Utilizing the SPSS computing function, the scores that each respondent attained were tallied up, resulting in a materialist and post-materialist index, each with a scale of 0 to 9. This scale came into being as two items from each table were combined, and as respondents were only allowed one first- and one second- option, with a first option scoring two points and a second option 1, whilst any item not selected scored 0.

A variable with a scale of 0 to 9 is less than practical in terms of index construction, making it imperative that the variable be converted to one ranging from 0 to 10. This was facilitated by multiplying all the scores by 1.1 recurring, which, although creating a variable with a scale of 0 to 10. Index construction complete, it was possible to assemble a continuum on which to map the population. In the instance of the 12-item model, only one continuum needed to be constructed, with the materialist pole on the left and the post-materialist on the right. The 18-item model requires the construction of two continuums, one along a pre-materialist/materialist spectrum, and one along a materialist/post-materialist spectrum. All three were constructed by theoretically placing the 'lower-order' pole at the left end of the scale, running in the negative numbers, with the 'higher order' index falling on the right. Mathematically this entailed multiplying the 'lower order' index by negative 1, and the 'higher order' index by positive 1, and then simply adding up the products.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Also see Liebenberg (1994), Van Zyl Slabbert (1992), Friedman and Atkinson (1994), Giliomee and Schlemmer (1994), Habib and Moodley (1993).
- ² Also see Giliomee (1995), Johnson and Schlemmer (1996), Shaw (2001), Giliomee and Schlemmer (1994), Sisk (1994).
- ³ Also see Friedman (1999), Lodge (1999), Maharaj (1999), Woods (2000), Southhall (2001).
- ⁴ SARB, South African National Accounts 1946-1998, June 1999 and SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2000.
- ⁵ CSS, *October Household Surveys*, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. Idasa's Budget Information Service, also claims that 36% of the potential workforce is unemployed in 2001 (*The Mail & Guardian*, 23 March 2001).
- ⁶ See Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, New York: Harper, 1954.
- ⁷ The *scarcity* hypothesis is built upon the premise that the greatest demand will be made for those entities for which there is the scarcest supply. Inglehart (1985:103) states that "an individual's priorities thus reflect one's socioeconomic environment". The *socialization* hypothesis focuses on the idea of generational replacement, whereby values are relatively stable and specific to a certain age group within a specific population. He asserted that exposure to a specific socialization process and socio-economic environment during one's formative years has a lasting effect, and can impact equally seriously on one's choice of priorities at a later stage (Abramson and Inglehart, 1987: 184).
- ⁸ For criticism see Duch and Taylor (1993), Clarke and Dutt (1991), Clarke, Kornberg, McIntyre, Bauer-Kaase and Kaase (1999), Davis and Davenport (1999), Davis, Dowley and Silver (1999), Marks (1997), Davis (2000), Flanagan (1987).
- ⁹ See section regarding the magnitude of unemployment as a national problem.
- ¹⁰ The 1981 samples did not include rural Blacks, and is therefore not deemed representative enough to be included in the study.
- ¹¹ See Kuklinski *et al*, 1991.
- ¹² For an overview of the two positions on the delivery of basic social services and goods see Bond, P. (2000) "Infrastructure Delivery: Class Apartheid" in *Indicator SA*. Vol. 17, No. 3. and Hassen, E. (2000) "Are Bricks and Mortar enough: Infrastructure Delivery" in *Indicator SA*. Vol 17. No 3.
- ¹³ For a detailed analysis of the increased reliance on private security, see Schonteich (1999).
- ¹⁴ On the basis of the results of the principal components analysis in Taylor (1998:88), only two factors were extracted.
- ¹⁵ Factor loadings were clearer on component 3 than component 2.