

Value Priorities in Israeli Society: An Examination of Inglehart's Theory of Modernization and Cultural Variation.

Ephraim Yuchtman-Ya'ar

Tel Aviv University

Introduction:

This paper examines Inglehart's theory of modernization (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker (2000), using evidence from Israeli society. It addresses two related questions: First, at the aggregate level, to what extent is Israel's location on the two-dimensional cross-cultural map (based on traditional vs. secular-rational values, and survival vs. self-expression values) compatible with this theory's premises and propositions? Second, at the individual level of analysis, to what extent do Israeli value orientations on these two dimensions conform to this theory's predictions?

Influenced by the spectacular success of Western societies in terms of economic growth and material affluence in the post World War II era, proponents of the logic of industrialism wrote extensively during the 1960's and 1970's about the historical inevitability and ultimate triumph of Industrial society. Accordingly, "The world is entering a new age – the age of total industrialization. Some countries are far along the road; many are just beginning the journey. But everywhere, at a faster or slower pace, the people of the world are on the march towards industrialization" (Kerr et al 1962:29). However, some prominent observers of modern society have argued that industrialization is not necessarily a linear process. Instead, it was suggested that it involves distinct stages of development. In accordance with this view, the more advanced stage of industrialization was captured by the concept of "post-industrial society" (Bell, 1973, 1976). Notwithstanding the general agreement on the structural changes and the economic and material benefits associated with post-industrial society, the scholarly community has been involved in an extensive debate on the impact of industrialization on societal culture and its value system. In the context of this debate, Inglehart's theory of

modernization represents an attempt to integrate two schools of thought regarding the evolution of relationships between economic progress and cultural change.

One school, originating with the Karl Marx, and further elaborated, for example, in the works of Daniel Lerner (1958), Dahrendorf (1959), (Daniel Bell (1973; 1976), Aron (1967) and Ronald Inglehart (1977; 1990), postulates that economic progress typically generates systematic changes in patterns of culture. For example, Inglehart (1977, 1990) argues that the transitions from pre-industrial to industrial society, and from industrial to post-industrial society have been accompanied by systematic shifts in the value priority of society.

Preoccupation with survival needs due to the almost total dependence on the forces of nature and the dominance of religious beliefs characterized the pre-industrial era. Industrialization increased the human ability to control the environment and enhanced its productive capacity.

This stage of development has been associated with a shift from an emphasis on basic survival needs to the pursuit of economic growth and material well being, along with a decline in religious and related traditional beliefs. Finally, the new phase of post-industrial society, characterized by unprecedented levels of affluence and safeguards provided by the welfare state, generates new priorities of human goals and social values that are essentially post-materialist, notably self-expression, subjective well-being and quality of life. Along with the shift towards these post-modern values, post-industrial society is moving further away from religious doctrines and traditional beliefs, becoming more rational and secular.

The other school of thought that was incorporated into Inglehart's theory of modernization acknowledges the role of cultural institutions and traditions in the process of industrialization. From Weber (1904) through the works of Dimaggio (1994) and Huntington (1993, 1996), it appears that cultural heritage, particularly its religious elements, tends to persist in the industrial era and exert its own influence on the process of modernization. Furthermore, as noted by Inglehart (2000:21), there are some salient instances when society may resort to traditional values and activate them in order to facilitate the transition to the industrial stage.

Accordingly, in order to understand the evolution of a societal hierarchy of values over time, both factors of level of industrial advancement and cultural traditions must be taken into consideration.

However, in addition to cultural heritage, other situation-specific factors also may shape the value priorities of society. A striking example of the influence of such factors emerges from the body of research on environmentalism, as discussed, for example, by Inglehart (1995) Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) and Brechin (1999). Thus, in order to explain the well-documented phenomenon of global environmental concern, these works in fact suggest a two-way theory of environmentalism. One way, typical of the affluent countries in the north, is compatible with the post-materialist thesis. Accordingly, even though the citizens of these countries are relatively less vulnerable to environmental hazards, such as air and water pollution, they tend to be highly supportive of environmental protection as an expression of the post-materialist syndrome. The other way, leading to environmental concern is more typical of citizens of countries in the south, where the degradation of the environment is relatively severe. Thus, the perception and experience of the risks associated with objective environmental problems may suffice to motivate the people in these countries to protect the environment.

Interestingly, in his more recent elaboration of modernization theory Inglehart (2000) has not acknowledged the role of situation-specific factors, other than those associated with cultural tradition. Nevertheless, we suggest that such factors – whether in the realm of environmental hazards or in other spheres of life - might have a profound influence on the value orientations of members of society. We explore this proposition through an examination of Inglehart's theory of modernization against evidence from Israeli society.

Some features of Israeli society:

The size of the Jewish population in Israel – a little over 5 millions – makes it one of the two largest Jewish communities in the world¹, and the only country where Jews constitute the large majority (81%) out of a total population of about 6.5 million people. The rest of Israel's citizens consist mainly of Palestinian-Arabs (16%), most of who are Moslems, and non-Arab Christian citizens (4%).² This demographic reality invites the question of where does the Jewish State fit within the global modernization map, as depicted by Inglehart's (2000) research. In addressing this question, some observations about Israeli society seem in order.

Firstly, Israel is a young immigrant society, where the bulk of the Jewish population is made of first (38%) and second (34%) generation immigrants.³ Originating from many parts of the globe, most of these immigrants fall into groups that represent some of the major “cultural zones” in terms of Huntington's (1993, 1996) classification. Thus, nearly one half migrated from Moslem countries in the Middle East (for example: Iraq, Yemen and Iran) and North Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). The rest came largely from Eastern and Central Europe, including many ex-communist countries that belong to the Orthodox (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Romania) or the Catholic (e.g. Poland, and Hungary) zones. Others arrived from Protestant (e.g. Germany and Holland), southern Catholic (e.g., France and Italy) or English-speaking countries such as the U.S.A. and Britain.⁴ While sharing a common religious and ethnic identity, the historical background and the cultural heterogeneity of these immigrant groups, coupled with the recency of their arrival, suggest that Israeli society is multi-cultural, and cannot be assigned to any specific cultural zone. This reality is manifested in the persistence of distinct traditions of countries of origin at both levels of “high” and “low” cultures among many of the immigrant groups and their descendants (Halper, Seroussi and Squires-Kidron, 1989; Regev, 1996, 2000; Zrubavel, 1995; Herzog and Ben-Raphael, 2001). Consequently the “melting pot” and “Israelization” processes, as envisioned by the

¹The other Jewish community of approximately the same size is located in the United States.

² Statistical Abstracts of Israel (CBS), 2001, # 52, table 2.1

³CBS, 2002, # 52, table 2.1

⁴CBS, 2001, # 52, table 2.23

founding fathers of Israeli society, have encountered many difficulties.⁵ In fact, Israeli culture has seemingly been molded by the interaction of at least three major sources of influence: The common Jewish heritage,⁶ the cultural baggage of countries of origin, and the Israeli experience in itself.

Secondly, notwithstanding the pervasive impact of the Immigrants' cultural traditions, Israeli society has developed some major cultural features of its own. Perhaps the most important expression of "being an Israeli" is the revival of the Hebrew language and its functioning as a critical integrative force and major means of communication in all spheres of life (Alter, 1994; Harshav, 1999; Katriel, 1986; Shavit, 2002).⁷ Of greater relevance to the issue under discussion is the crystallization within Israeli society of the "culture of security". Influenced by the ongoing, sanguineous conflict with its Arab neighbors, particularly the Palestinians, life in Israel has been shaped by frequent wars and constant fears faced with a hostile environment. The pervasive sense of existential threat was manifested, among other things, in the centrality of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) in Israeli politics and the unsurpassed esteem bestowed on it by the Israeli public. (Yuchtman-Yaar and Peres, 2000). In fact, Israeli democracy, both at the level of collective institutions and of individual attitudes has, in fact, been heavily influenced by the priority accorded to considerations of national and personal security (Arian, Talmud and Herman, 1988, Bartal et. al., 1998, Barzilay, 1996, Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1989, Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1992, Shamir and Shamir, 1993, Sprinzak and Diamond, 1993).

Thirdly, Israeli Jews, like Jews everywhere, share a collective historical memory that stresses the common experience of anti-Semitism, discrimination and persecution. In particular, the

⁵On these Issues, see, for example: Eisenstadt, 1954, 1967, 1985; Smooha, 1978; Ben-Raphael, 1982; Ben-Raphael and Sharot, 1991; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Leshem and Shuval, 1998; Lissak, 1999.

⁶On the historical significance of the Jewish heritage see, for example, Eisenstadt, 1992.

⁷The renaissance of Hebrew and its acceptance as the dominant language has been a major subject of cultural and political struggles, particularly at the early stages of building the new society. For example, when the "Technion" – Israel's Institute of Technology – was established in 1912 (it was actually opened in 1924), the board of trustees was involved in a fierce debate about whether the institute should adopt Hebrew or German as its teaching language.

Jewish Holocaust that took place during World War II has played a major role in the national narrative, and the establishment of Israel as a Jewish State has been celebrated as a triumph of the Jewish people over those intending to exterminate it. At the same time, from early childhood through adulthood, Israelis are reminded through their adult lives that the danger of anti-Semitism has not passed and that the State of Israel is the only country where Jews can seek refuge in times of persecution.⁸ This collective memory, captured by such slogans as “Never Again”, combined with the harsh reality of the Israeli-Arab conflict, has profoundly affected Israeli culture and identity (Elon, 1971; Handelman and Katz, 1990; Wistrich and Ohana, 1995; Zrubavel, 1995). Given its preoccupation with the problem of national security and survival, it seems reasonable to expect the members of Israeli society to lag behind, regarding the development of at least some of the values associated with modernization, particularly those captured by the post-materialist syndrome.

Fourthly, along with its emphasis on the theme of national survival, Israeli society has made a considerable effort to become a modern, post-industrial society. This effort has been at least moderately successful, as manifested by a series of criteria that are commonly regarded as major indicators of a post-industrialism. Its GDP per capita of \$18,600 in 1999⁹ places Israel within the small group of advanced economies, albeit closer to the lower edge of this group. By this criterion, Israel ranks somewhat higher than Spain and Italy but considerably lower than most West European countries, and far lower than the U.S.A.. Similarly, the structure of Israel’s labor force in terms of economic sectors closely follows the post-industrial pattern, with about 73% employed in the service sector, 28% in industry, and 2% in agriculture.¹⁰ In the domain of science and technology, the Israeli government investment in research and development as a percentage of GNP - 2.3% - is one of the highest rates in the world. By comparison, it is 2.1% in the USA, 2.0%, in France 1.7% in the UK and stands at 1.6% in

⁸In the spirit of this attitude, one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) is “The Law of Return” according to which every Jew is entitled to immigrate to Israel and become its citizen.

⁹CBS, 2001, table 28.6

¹⁰CBS, 2001, table 12.11

Canada and Norway (Aharoni and Aharoni, 2000, p. 84). Correspondingly, the national expenditure on research and development in 1999, measured as an index of final expenditure per capita (U.S. = 100), was 86.8. This figure was considerably higher than that of most OECD member countries for that year.¹¹ In the sphere of higher education, Israeli universities generate relatively large numbers of science and engineering doctorates. According to figures provided by the National Science Board (1996)¹², the rate of science & engineering doctorates granted per 100,000 participants in the labor force in 1992 was 14.6 in Norway, 19.6 in the USA, 21.7 in the UK, 24.2 in Israel and 26.1 in Germany. The emphasis on advanced industries is reflected in the share of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the Israeli economy. Thus, the percent of ICT from total export in 1998 was 20.1% - considerably higher than the 12.5% average for members of the OECD in that year (CBS, 2001, table 28.11). As for the participation rate of women in the labor force – still another major indicator of level of modernization – Israel's rate of 55.0 % in 1999 puts it below the average of the OECD countries, which, in that year stood at 59.5% (OECD, 2000). According to figures provided by the World Bank (1999)¹³, the participation of Israeli women in the civilian labor force as a percentage of men in 1997 stood at 0.7 – the same percentage as in Germany and Holland and just below Britain, France and the USA. However, the figure for Israel is somewhat inflated since the rate of participation of men in the civilian labor force is lower than the average for the OECD. Finally, Israel's national expenditure on health services as a percentage of the GDP in 1999 was 8.3 – just above the average of the OECD at that year.¹⁴

For reasons of space we will just mention that Israel's modernity is also manifested in other diverse spheres such as level of schooling, life expectancy, and social services. All these indicators, taken together, indicate that Israel can be regarded as a modest member of the

¹¹CBS, 2001, table 28.10

¹²National Science Board, Science and Engineering indicators 1996, The figures for Israel are based on data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

¹³World Bank, 1999. World Development Indicators 1999, table 13.

¹⁴CBS, 2001, table 28.9

small group of post-industrial nations. Following Inglehart's argument concerning the relationship between economic development and value priorities, and given its post-industrial characteristics, we would expect Israeli society to be oriented towards rational/secular and self-expression values.

Fifthly, Israeli society constitutes the heritage of the over 100 years old history of the Zionist movement. Influenced by the Western model of the nation-state, along with the ideas of democracy and economic progress, the Zionist movement was essentially secular in ideology and practice. In fact, many of its leaders, particularly those on the left, were anti-religious, blaming the traditional orthodox leadership for the stagnation and misery of the Jewish people in the European Diaspora. As for the latter, the prevailing view was that the redemption of the Jews and the return to the "Land of Israel" could be accomplished only through a divine act, namely the coming of the Messiah. The radical wing of Jewish orthodoxy – the ultra-orthodox - was therefore vehemently anti-Zionist, and has remained so until the present time. Other, more moderate rabbis, have come to terms with the Zionist movement and joined its ranks in the belief that it signified the first stage towards redemption. Nevertheless, Jewish orthodoxy played a relatively marginal role in the history of the Zionist movement during the pre-State era and in the early years following statehood.

However, following the mass immigration of Jews from Moslem countries during the 1950's and early 1960's, and since most of them were at least moderately religious, Israeli society has become more balanced in terms of the secular/religious division of its citizens. Given this demographic change, along with political considerations aimed at preserving national unity, the largely secular political leadership had to reach a compromise on certain fundamental issues with the religious community. One manifestation of such a compromise is the fact that Israel is one of the few democracies that makes no separation between state and religion. Similarly, various religious norms, such as observing Kashrut in all public-owned institutions and, with a few exceptions (e.g., restaurants, prohibiting any form of work and business on

the Sabbath, are enforced by law. Furthermore, even certain privately owned enterprises, such as hotels, observe Kashrut in order to be able to do business with religious and traditional clientele. In fact, as indicated by recent survey conducted in 1998 (Levi, Levinson and Katz, 2002), Israeli society represents a mixture of religious, traditional and secular influences – a reality that coincides with the varying degrees of religiousness of its Jewish citizens.¹⁵

Taken as a whole, this brief depiction of some of the major attributes of Israeli society suggests that this society has been under the influence of countervailing forces regarding the evolution of its value hierarchy. On the one hand, its relatively high level of socio-economic development, coupled with a viable democratic regime and a sizeable secular population, predisposes this society towards to embrace values of rational/secular nature, as well as self-expression values. On the other hand, the pervasive emphasis on national security and the constant concern with the problem of national existence, coupled with the persistence of religious heritage within notable segments of its population, pulls Israel in the direction of traditional and survival values. Since it is difficult to ascertain a-priori the resultant of these conflicting forces, we need to wait for the empirical results in order to see where Israel is located on the two dimensions of cultural variation, relatively to other societies.

Aside from its implications for inter-societal differences in value priorities, Inglehart's theory of modernization ventures to explain and predict individual variation in this domain within society, on the basis of a series of variables, such as birth cohort (coming of age in affluent times), schooling, and income (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). The validity of the theory's hypotheses has been tested against empirical evidence taken from a fairly large number of societies,

¹⁵Survey research based on national probability samples of the adult Jewish population in Israel typically shows that about 18% define themselves either as "ultra-orthodox" (7%) or "orthodox" (11%), 27% as "traditional", and 54% as "secular". In the questionnaire used for the purpose of the present study, we used two options for secular, one of which was "Secular, following some of the religious customs". This option was picked up by 25%, while the other – "secular" was chosen by 30% of the respondents. However, we believe that the seculars who keep some of the religious customs refer mostly to ceremonial events, such as Passover, that are celebrated by many Jews because of their significance in Jewish national history or as social and cultural events, rather than because of their religious significance.

including evidence on changes over time. No systematic study of this kind has, however, been conducted in Israel, particularly in recent years.¹⁶ Inglehart's recent conceptualization of the two dimensions of cultural variation provides an opportunity to examine the extent to which the theory may account for location on these dimensions across individual members of Israeli society. This task will be undertaken in the second part of the empirical analysis.

Method:

The data we use is based on a representative national survey of the adult Israeli population (N= 1199).¹⁷ Face-to-face interviews were conducted during August-September, 2001. The questionnaire included a large number of items taken from the World Values Surveys project. For the purpose of this study we chose the 10 items pertaining to the characterization of the two dimensions of value orientation, as listed in Inglehart (2000, table 1, p. 24). A factor analysis of these items, based on the World Values Survey data for 65 nations (aggregated), yielded two orthogonal factors, one representing a traditional vs. secular/rational dimension and the other a survival vs. self-expression dimension.¹⁸ The first dimension mainly reflects cross-cultural differentiation in the importance attached to God, socialization to obedience and religious faith, and to authority. It also taps attitudes on abortion as well as sense of national pride. The variables characterizing the second dimension consist of items measuring the materialist/post-materialist syndrome, individual happiness, civil participation (signing

¹⁶Some aspects of the post-materialist argument in the context of Israeli society were examined in the 1980's (Gottlieb and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1983; Yuchtman-Yaar and Gottlieb, 1985, Yuchtman-Yaar, 1987).

¹⁷We have excluded Arab respondents from the present analysis, since the national identity of most members of this minority is Palestinian. Therefore, some of the items comprising the two dimensions have quite different meanings for Arabs and Jews. For example, when asked "to what extent are you proud to be an Israeli?" many Arabs would answer "to a small extent" or "not at all". However, such an answer would typically reflect their strong sense of pride in being Palestinians, as well as hostility to Israel, a Jewish state in which their status is that of a discriminated against minority, rather than because of universalistic or cosmopolitan preferences. In any event, Arabs represent only about 12% of the adult Israeli population so that their exclusion from the analysis has little effect on the overall results.

¹⁸In this study, we used a larger sample, which includes 81 societies. However, the factorial structure obtained for this sample is essentially the same as that of the smaller sample.

petitions), attitudes on homosexuality, and trustfulness.¹⁹ The countries' location on each of the two dimensions is represented in the form of standardized factor scores, obtained by the summation of the country standard score for each variable multiplied by its factor coefficient.

For the purpose of the second phase of this study, which involves individual-level analysis, namely the effects of individual attributes on value orientation as measured by the two factors, we have used the following as independent variables:

Age -natural scale.

Country of origin - a nominal scale, distinguishing between European-American origin (Ashkenazi Jews), Middle-Eastern and North-African origin (Sephardi Jews), and 2nd generation Israeli Jews.²⁰

Income – a 9 level scale representing gross household income.

Education – a 10 level scale ranging from elementary schooling or less through academic degree.

Political orientation - a 10 level scale ranging from 1 (right) to 10 (left).

Degree of religiousness – a 5 level scale ranging from ultra-orthodox through orthodox, traditional, secular who follows some religious norms, and secular.²¹

Discussion and Findings:

A. Aggregate Analysis:

As a first step in the analysis, for the Israeli sample we computed z-scores for each of the 10 variables comprising the two scales, on the basis of the respective mean scores of the 81 nations, with the results reported in Table 1.²²

¹⁹For a detailed discussion of the meaning of these items see pp. 25-28 in Inglehart (2000).

²⁰Largely because of their origin in Moslem countries, Sephardi Jews tend to be more traditional than Ashkenazi Jews.

²¹For a discussion of the meaning of this categorization and its scaling properties, see Yuchtaman-Ya'ar and Peres (2000), pp. 107-129.

Table 1: Means of 10 Variables Characterizing Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation for 81 Societies and Corresponding Z-scores for Israeli Society

	means	Z-scores
Importance of God	7.19	0.16
Importance of teaching obedience and religious faith vs. independence and determination	0.12	0.91
Attitude toward abortion	3.81	0.21
Sense of national pride	1.61	- 0.31
Respect of authority	1.57	- 0.05
Priority of economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life	1.81	0.81
Self-happiness	1.97	- 0.06
Signing a petition	2.01	- 0.40
Attitude toward homosexuality	3.38	1.09
Trusting people	1.71	0.17

* higher scores indicate preference for secular-rational or self-expression values

We next computed for this sample the two total factor scores, weighting the 10 variables by their factor coefficients. The obtained scores were 0.33 and 0.68 for the Traditional/Secular-Rational and Survival/Self-Expression scales, respectively. These scores locate Israel just moderately high on the first scale and fairly high on the second one. In order to put these scores in a more detailed comparative perspective, Figures 1 and 2 depict its location on two of Inglehart's two-dimensional maps, the first of which divides the resulting space according to cultural zones and the second according to economic zones (Inglehart, 2000, pp. 29 and 30).

Before dwelling on the general meaning of Israel's position on the two world maps, a discussion of the specific z-scores from which its factor scores were derived seems in order. Beginning with the variables characterizing the traditional-secular/rational dimension (Inglehart, 2000, table 1), it will be noticed that three of the z-scores are positive and two are negative. These results are consistent with the argument that the value orientations of Israelis are susceptible to the effects of a variety of countervailing forces. Thus, on the one hand, they tend to be relatively open-minded on the justification of abortion (z-score = 1.21), to prefer teaching children independence and determination rather than obedience and religious faith (z-score = 0.91), and somewhat less inclined to acknowledge the importance of God (z-score = 0.16). On the other hand, they tend to have a strong sense of national pride (z-score = -0.31) and to favor respect for authority (z-score = -0.05). We believe that the positive z-scores reflect the influence of Israel's experience of democracy and its commitment to post-

²² The addition of Israel increased the size of the international sample from 80 to 81.

Figure 1: Israel's Value Position / Cultural Zones





Figure 2: Israel's Value Position / Economic Zones



industrialism, whereas the negative scores represent its deep concern with the threat to its national existence.

Turning to the survival/self-expression dimension, we again notice a mixture of positive and negative z-scores, though the former tends to be more salient than the latter. Thus, consistent with their attitudes towards abortion, Israelis appear to be relatively tolerant towards homosexuality (z-score = 1.09) and, albeit to a lesser extent, to prefer values of self-expression and quality of life (z-score = 0.81). The latter finding is somewhat surprising since we expected the Israeli public to be quite strongly oriented towards the materialistic, namely, the survival pole, given its pervasive concern with the problem of national existence.

However, it is possible that this result derives from the composition of a battery of items used to measure the materialist/post materialist values in Inglehart's recent study (Inglehart, 2000). Specifically, although one of the materialist items included in this battery refers to the goal of keeping order in the country, it does not include the item referring to the goal of ensuring that the country will have strong military forces. We believe that the inclusion of this item in the construction of the materialist/post-materialist index might have considerably reduced Israel's score on this scale. This possibility is suggested by the observation that 45.0% of Israeli Jewish respondents chose this item as first priority and 30.4% as second priority. These percentages are somewhat higher than the priority given to economic growth, and considerably higher than the priorities given to the two post-materialist items included in this battery.²³ As to the negative z-score pertaining to the issue of signing a petition (-0.40), it, too, seems to fall in line with Israel's absorption with the question of national security. Like the item on national pride, it reflects the tendency to stand behind the government, particularly in times of crisis, which prevailed when the fieldwork for this study took place.²⁴ For this reason

²³This set of items, which is part of Inglehart's original scale of the materialist/post-materialist syndrome, was included in the questionnaire used in this study.

²⁴It was conducted in the midst of the Palestinian intifadah, which has seriously undermined the Israelis' sense of national and personal security.

it should come as no surprise that Israelis were not inclined to describe themselves as very happy (z-score = -0.06).

The overall position of Israel on the two dimensions of cultural variation can most clearly be seen from the maps given in figures 1 and 2. Starting with the map containing the cultural zones, it appears that Israel is located somewhat right to the mid-point of the horizontal axis (the survival/self-expression dimension) and just above the mid-point of the vertical axis (the traditional/secular-rational dimension). This puts Israel in the vicinity of such countries as Belgium, France and Austria with regard to the Survival/Self-Expression dimension and to Netherlands, Switzerland and Finland in terms of the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension. Relatively to some other Western societies, Israel is considerably less secular/rational than, for example, West Germany, Denmark and Norway, but more so than Britain, Canada, and U.S.A. As to the Survival/Self-Expression dimension, it is positioned, lower than most West-European countries, as well as the U.S.A. but somewhat higher than, say Italy and Spain. Generally speaking, Israel can clearly be regarded as part of the Western Democratic zone, at least in terms of the cultural characteristics captured by the two dimensions. From this viewpoint, it probably represents an oddity in the geopolitical zone to it belongs, namely the Middle East – a fact that might have affected its relationships with the surrounding Moslem countries. This suggestion gains support from the observation that Israel is located close to most Western societies according to the map of economic zones, as can be seen from Figure 2. By this criterion, it ranks much above its neighbors, where the GNP per capita falls in the range of \$1000 to \$2000. Interestingly, Israel's location in terms of the two dimensions of cultural space seems quite consistent with its position on the map of economic zones. In both respects it appears to be a modest member of the group of post-industrial and post materialist societies.

B. Individual-Level Analysis:

We now turn to examine Inglehart's theory of modernization with respect to cultural variation among individual members of society. Essentially, the question under discussion is the extent to which individuals' value priorities are systematically related to various demographic and socio-economic characteristics, such as age and levels of income and education. Accordingly, we performed two regression analyses, in which the Traditional/Secular-Rational and the Survival/Self-Expression measures were used as dependent variables and the 6 individual characteristics listed above were entered as independent variables.

Beginning with the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension, it may be noticed from the regression coefficients presented in Table 2 that all the 6 independent variables exert significant effects on this measure, though to varying degrees. Furthermore, all these effects are in the "right" direction, in terms of the considerations of modernization theory. Thus, the tendency to embrace secular-rational values is more varies positively with higher levels of education and income and negatively with age. Such values are also associated with Ashkenazi (European/American) origin, with political inclination towards the left and, in particular, with secular self-identity. Since the effects of the first four independent variables seem self-explanatory, given the premises of modernization theory, we comment briefly on the other two independent variables. The finding with regard to the effect of the right-left scale is probably consistent with the results of prior research according to which the right tends to be more patriotic and nationalist politically, as well as more conservative and traditional socially. It should be born in mind that the items characterizing the factor underlying this dimension pertain to issues such as national pride, respect for authority, and attitudes towards abortion. The observation that that religious-secular scale appears to have the strongest influence on this measure is apparently not surprising, given that one of its characterizing items refers to the importance of God in one's life. In order to test this explanation we ran a regression in which the item on God was deleted from the Traditional-

Secular/Rational measure. However, the results of this analysis indicate that the reduction in the effect of the religious-secular variable was relatively small - from a coefficient (unstandardized) of .25 in the original regression - to a coefficient of .21 in the special regression. These results point to the central role played by religiousness in the formation of traditional versus secular-rational values, at least in Israeli society. The importance of the religious factor is further indicated by the observation that when this variable was excluded from the equation predicting the measure of the Traditional-Secular/Rational dimension, the amount of explained variance was reduced from 50% to 31%. Although the size of the total variance explained by the remaining independent variables is quite respectable, taking into account that the regression involves individual-level analysis, the explanatory power of the religious-secular scale cannot be exaggerated.

Turning now to the second regression equation (Table 3), it appears that the “classical” independent variables in Inglehart’s modernization, namely age, education and income, exert significant effects, and in the right direction, on the measure of the Survival-Self/Expression, similarly to the previous equation. Accordingly the preference for Self-Expression values increases with younger age and with higher income and education levels. The effect of the political variable is also significant, and according priority to Self-Expression values is therefore more typical of left than right-oriented Israeli citizens. Ethnic origin also seems to play a role in this domain, with Ashkenazi and 2nd generation Israelis more likely to adopt such values, albeit to a small degree. However, the religious-secular variable, seemingly such an influential factor in the choice between traditional versus secular/rational values, is apparently an insignificant agent of socialization where the dimension of Survival-Self Expression is concerned. This finding is somewhat perplexing, since attitude on homosexuality is included among the items comprising this measure. However, an examination of the relationships between the religious-secular scale and the other variables comprising the Survival/Self-Expression measure indicates that religious people tend to be somewhat happier and more trusting of other people. These tendencies apparently neutralize

the counter-effects of the negative attitudes toward homosexuality, so that the overall influence of the religious factor is practically zero. It should also be noted that the total explained variance of this equation (33%) is approximately the same as the amount of explained variance in the previous equation (31%) – when the latter did not include the religious factor as one of its independent variables.

Conclusions:

With regard to the aggregate level of analysis, the case of Israel may appear “boring” in the sense that its location vis-à-vis other contemporary societies on the global cultural map fits quite well with the hypotheses derived from Inglehart’s theory of modernization. This conclusion is seemingly relevant both to the economic development thesis of this theory and to its argument regarding the importance of specific situational factors, such as cultural tradition. At the same time, the Israeli case draws attention to some aspects of the theory that may require further elaboration. In particular, we need to better understand the meaning of the materialist/post-materialist syndrome, which constitutes a central ingredient in the measure of the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. Thus, Israel’s relatively advanced level of industrial and economic development has apparently been conducive to the inculcation of post-materialist values to its citizens. On the other hand, the perpetuation of the political and military threat to its existence, and the security culture that has evolved as a result of this threat, pulls Israel’s citizens towards the survival pole of this dimension. What is needed, therefore, is to study more cases, such as Israeli society, where different aspects of modern values are not mutually consistent. This may lead us to a better understanding of the conditions under which such values are more likely to develop.

As for the level of individual analysis, we again notice that the results are generally in line with the basic arguments of modernization theory. However, in view of the prominence of the religious factor in regard to the Traditional-Secular/Rational dimension, and its disappearance

as a relevant factor in relation to the Survival/Self-Expression dimension, it seems worthwhile to make greater efforts towards understanding the role of religiousness in these domains.

Finally, and unrelated to Israel's case, the wealth of empirical data accumulated by the World Value Project calls for a systematic hierarchical analysis that would make it possible to differentiate between individual and societal, or perhaps broader contextual effects, on the evolution of value orientations.

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