

The relations between religion and politics in the contemporary Western world: The impact of secularization, postmodernization and peoples' basic value orientations

by

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Introduction

Religion can be related to politics in a number of ways. For instance, religion has been found to legitimate regimes, to divert social grievances into other-worldly concerns, to yield support for social movements, and to provide understandings of justice which have given rise to social change (Williams 1996: 368). To search for cross-cultural explanations for all of these different relationships is a complex task. There are different dimensions and/or levels of the religious and political systems to consider, and different contexts in time and space to take into account (Jelen & Wilcox 2002a, 2002b). Thus, the many relationships between religion and politics may depend on both the contents and levels of the various religious and political systems, and their different socio-cultural contexts.

To narrow the discussion to the contemporary Western world with its predominantly Christian cultural heritage, religion and politics are mostly partially separated. "Inasmuch as both religion and politics are social institutions and consist of subgroups, norms, and people, they interact with one another; they sometimes overlap in their functions; they often involve the same people; they seek commitment and involvement from the same people" (Johnstone 1988: 122). In these societies, the relevant question concerns the specific kinds of partial separation that exist: "partial separation is itself a variable and tends to fluctuate toward one extreme or the other" (ibid). Thus, even if the analysis is confined to the contemporary Western world, there are indeed

¹ To a certain extent, this paper builds on a previous paper titled "Religion and politics in contemporary society. Differentiation or dedifferentiation?", which I have written together with Dr Loek Halman, Tilburg university, the Netherlands.

many examples of different relations between religion and politics.

This paper will investigate only one of the many different relationships between religion and politics, namely whether people *want* religion to have an impact on politics or not. In order to get a better understanding of peoples' normative views in this regard, both the impact of structural factors like the degree of secularization and postmodernization, and the importance of peoples' basic value orientations and socio-economic background will be investigated, using a cross-cultural data set from 38 countries in the contemporary Western world. As an introduction to these analyses, a set of theoretical arguments will be introduced. Then the data, measurements, analytical strategies, and results will be described. In a concluding section, the findings will be discussed and evaluated.

Secularization, postmodernization, and views on the relation between religion and politics

Needless to say, religious studies have since long been concerned with secularization as a major factor affecting contemporary society, and almost all of the founding fathers in social and cultural research made important contributions to the study of it. Therefore, one should not talk about *the* secularization theory, but rather of the secularization paradigm, which includes a number of different understandings of what secularization is (Gorski 2000: 141).

However, despite this variation, most secularization theorists agree that the differentiation between the religious and the secular institutions is a key dimension of secularization. Most also agree that this differentiation has increased over time, at least in the Western world, and that specialized roles and institutions have developed in order to handle specific features or functions which were previously carried out by religious institutions. Due to differentiation “specialized agencies developed which rested their claims increasingly on technical competence rather than on religiously acclaimed moral authority” (Wilson 1996: 17), and the religious institutions came to lose much of their previous social functions to the end that they are no longer the main providers of education, health care, social welfare, etc. Instead, the latter functions have become increasingly independent of each other and developed their own and distinct rationalities. When secularization is understood as the differentiation between the religious and the secular spheres, it is just one specific instance of the broader theme of general functional differentiation. In this sense, secularization can be described as the repercussion of this general development on the religious subsystem (Dobbelaere 1995: 1). Paradoxically, due to this kind of secularization, the

religious subsystem is assumed to have become relatively *more* occupied with “pure religion”, unsoiled from various thisworldly concerns as for instance politics!

If most secularization theorists agree on the differentiation thesis, there is more disagreement about the consequences of the differentiation between the religious and secular spheres. Some assume that peoples’ religious involvement has declined over time. Memberships rates in churches and denominations are said to have decreased, and adherence to religious belief systems and world views to have diminished. The religious decline is assumed to be especially apparent in Western Europe, and strong evidence for the progressive and apparently still continuing decline of religion is most often found there (Casanova 1994; Acquaviva 1979). Whether a corresponding decline is also experienced in other contexts as e.g. the U.S. is more debated (e.g. Stark & Finke 2000). Others assume that the differentiation between religious and secular institutions primarily takes the form of the privatization of religion. As the religious and secular institutions have become differentiated, religion is assumed to have become increasingly marginal to the public domain, while in contrast it is assumed to have remained more significant to personal and private matters. “Religion may continue within the private space of the body of individuals, but the public space of the body of populations is now subordinated, not to the *conscience collective*, the sacred canopy or the civil religion, but to secular disciplines, economic constraints and political coercion. The public realm is desacralized in Western industrial societies” (Turner 1991: 9; italics in the original).

It is far beyond the scope of this paper to review all the research on secularization processes. However, it should be emphasized that religious differentiation, religious decline and religious privatization are usually not assumed to have developed in a more or less the same way in different social and cultural contexts. Rather, due to differences in e.g. economic development, social welfare, individualization, educational achievements, church structures, church-state relations, the relationships between religious traditions and ethnic divisions, etc., secularization is usually said to be an uneven process (e.g. Bruce 1999: 21f). For instance, the degree of secularization is well known to differ between Catholic and Protestant countries, between a religiously mixed and “pillarized” country as e.g. The Netherlands, and a Protestant dominated pluralistic immigrant country as e.g. the U.S. But whatever these differences, one would expect higher levels of differentiation between religion and other spheres, higher levels of religious privatization, and lower levels of religious involvement to be associated with fewer normative preferences for a religious impact on politics. This is one of the main, hopefully non-

controversial assumptions of this investigation.

However, during the last decade, the secularization paradigm has been under sharp attack. It has even been concluded that it is time “to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper ‘Requiescat in pace’” (Stark and Finke 2000: 79). This view is partly built on the claim that religious participation primarily depends on the religious supply and especially on the level of *religious pluralism* among churches and denominations. The higher the religious pluralism and the lower the religious regulation, the higher the levels of religious participation (see e. g. Finke and Stark 1989, 1992; Finke et al. 1996; Iannaccone 1991, 1992; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and McCann 1993; Stark and Finke 2000; Hamberg and Pettersson 1994, 1997, 2002; Pettersson and Hamberg 1997). Some relate this impact of religious pluralism to *competition* between the religious organizations. The more competition they face, the more likely they would be to adapt their supplies to peoples’ demands in order to maintain or increase their market shares. Such market adaptation can be expected to result in a rich and diversified supply of religious “goods” and thus to increase the likelihood that consumers can find religious goods well adapted to their individual tastes. Another line of thought assumes that religious participation will be lower, the more *regulated* the religious sector is (see e.g. Chaves and Cann 1992). The reason is that regulation limits competition and hence has a negative impact on the quality and diversity of religious supply. Therefore, regulation of religious markets will have a negative impact on the quality and diversity of religious supply, and therefore lead to lower levels of religious participation.

Recently, it has however been argued that a diversified religious supply is not a universal factor leading to increased religious participation. Rather, the impact of a diversified supply seems to be moderated by the degree of diversity in religious demands (Hamberg and Pettersson 2002). Where there is great diversity of religious demand, religious participation will be higher, the more diverse the religious supply. Where there is little diversity of religious demand, however, the diversity of religious supply will not resonate with the homogeneity of religious demands, and the diversity of religious supply will have less impact on religious participation. Therefore, rather than being a universal factor leading to increasing religious participation, pluralism in the religious supply would mainly yield enhanced religious participation where there is heterogeneity in peoples’ religious beliefs, tastes, and preferences.

According to this view, religious involvement and pro-religious orientations are expected to

grow in contexts which are pluralistic, *both* with regard to the degree of pluralism among churches and denominations *and* the degree of heterogeneity in peoples' religious outlooks and preferences. In a very general sense, such cultural contexts may be referred to by labels such as postmodern or late modern society. For the purpose of this paper, there is no need to go into a careful discussion on how to distinguish between late modernity and postmodernity. Rather, these two concepts will be used as more or less synonymous summary descriptions of some of the key cultural characteristics of the contemporary individualized and economically advanced information and knowledge society. Since postmodernity is a contested concept, it is "difficult to make an overall assessment of the many and diverse elements that have been included under the label of post-modernity or post-modernism" (Thomson 1992: 252). Postmodernization is said to affect different areas as e.g. culture, state, politics, and individual identity (Crook et al. 1992: 221f). In culture, postmodernization has been characterized by a consumerism of ready-made lifestyles, and the collapse of a more or less unified cultural tradition into different cultural segments. With regard to the state, postmodernism is said to challenge the idea of an autonomous entity with privileged links with politics and the public sphere. In the political realm, postmodernization is assumed to mark a shift from economic to socio-cultural concerns, while with regard to individual identity and equality, it is said to foster multiple and cross-cutting identities which are situated in a number of "imagined communities", where membership is a matter of taste and choice. In this sense, there are indeed a great variety of phenomena which go under the name of post-modernism (Åhlberg 1992:270; cf Åhlberg 2000).

In a general sense, one common theme in the many different understandings of post- or late modernity seems to be that it is associated with increasing emphasis on individual reflexivity and autonomy. In the contemporary individualized society, people are said to make their own decisions, "rather than simply living up to the expectations of community or fulfilling obligations to someone else" (Wuthnow 1991:12), and individual identity is assumed to be increasingly open, reflective, differentiated, and individuated (cf. Berger et al. 1973). People tend to see themselves as increasingly free to choose the convictions, beliefs, and practices they like. In late modern society, there are few compulsory obligations. "Even the most reliable authorities can be trusted only 'until further notice'; and the abstract systems that penetrate so much of day-to-day life normally offers multiple possibilities rather than fixed guidelines or recipes for actions" (Giddens 1991:84). Another theme in the many different understandings of post- or late modern culture seems to be that growing numbers of different world views are offered by growing numbers of market oriented suppliers and "a whole range of small-group,

non-class political practices-micropolitics” (Thomson 1992: 235). In this way, the contemporary post or late modern society seems to be characterized by increasing influences for personal choices from a growing pool of equally permissible world views. When growing numbers of individuals choose freely from an enlarged pool of ideological options, the probability that they will choose differently increases. As a consequence, individual value systems and ideological memberships will become more pluralistic (Halman and Pettersson 2002).

In this sense, one of the hallmarks of culture in postmodern or late modern culture appears to be pluralism, both with regard to individual world views and meso-level ideological-based associations and communities. In accordance with the recent critical developments of secularization theory, which claim that these two kinds of pluralism drive towards higher levels of religious participation, postmodern or late modern pluralistic culture can therefore be expected to yield increased religious involvement, and hence to give rise to more positive attitudes towards a religious influence on politics. Thus, in such regards there are reasons to expect postmodernization and secularization to drive in *opposite* directions. While secularization would yield decreased preferences for a religious influence on politics, postmodernization would generate increased. This is a second and maybe more controversial of the main assumptions of this paper.

The assumption that postmodernity is related to a renewed concern for religion is not new. For instance, it has been argued that a return to religion is required in order to solve post-modernity’s growing emphasis on self-interest and its negative impact on morality (Bell 1976: 171; for a fuller discussion, see O’Neill 1988). It has also been suggested that secularization is primarily related to the industrialization phase of modernization, but not to the subsequent postmodern developments in advanced industrial society. During the latter stages, previous secularization processes are said to be counterbalanced by “growing concerns for the meaning and purpose of life” (Inglehart and Baker 2002: 49). However, the former claim seems to be basically speculative in nature, and the latter to take for granted that concerns for the meaning of life must be religious in nature. There are also opposite assumptions about the relationship between postmodernity and religion. For instance, it has been claimed that Western postmodern consumerism “erodes the foundation of traditional lifestyles and therefore corrodes traditional religious practices” (Turner 2000: 111). Thus, even if the claim that postmodernity would foster religious involvement is neither new, nor unchallenged, the theoretical foundation for this claim, which is forwarded in this investigation, differs from the theoretical underpinnings of the earlier

assumptions in this regard. In this paper, the assumption is based on recent critical developments in secularization theory, which are founded on a rational-choice theory understanding of human behavior, and which assume cultural pluralism in both religious supply and religious demand to drive towards increased religious involvement.

As an introduction to the empirical tests of the hypothesis of a differential impact of secularization and postmodernization, two different measures of peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and politics will be developed. In a subsequent section, the hypothesis will be tested with only macro-level data. In a following set of analyses, individual level data on peoples' basic value orientations and socio-economic background will be included in the analysis. In a concluding section, the major findings will be discussed and evaluated.

Two dimensions of peoples' normative views on the relation between religion and politics

This analysis is based on data from 38 countries being mainly influenced by Christianity in their religious traditions. This choice is made in order to obtain contexts with roughly similar understandings of the concept of religion (cf. the wordings of the questionnaire items mentioned below). The data come from the most recent European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) 1999/2000 wave.² The selected 38 countries and their respective sample sizes are listed in the appendix. They are also shown in Figure 1 below.

Two dimensions of peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics

As already mentioned, this investigation will cover only one of the many different relations between religion and politics, namely whether people *want* religion to have an impact on politics or not. In the EVS/WVS questionnaire, these views are tapped by agreement-disagreement to the following four statements:

- A) Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office;
- B) Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections,
- C) It would be better for (one's country), if more people with strong religious beliefs hold public office, and
- D) Religious leaders should not influence government decisions.

² For further information on the EVS and WVS projects, see e.g. Harding et al. 1986; Ester et al. 1994; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Halman 2001; Inglehart and Baker 2000; see also the websites: <http://evs.kub.nl> and www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

For these items, a 5-point response scale, ranging from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” was used. All four items were used in the 1991 ISSP module on religion, and items B and D also in the 1998 module (see Tos et al. 1999).

At face validity, statements A and C can be assumed to tap the degree to which one prefers religiously involved people to hold public office and thereby to affect public and political matters. A problem with statement A is that it contains a double negation, and that it therefore may be difficult to understand. Also at face validity, statements B and D can be assumed to tap tolerance for religious leaders who try to influence voting patterns and government decisions. A problem with these two statements is however that both are negatively formulated, and that hence similar responses to them may be explained by this factor. In order to investigate these assumptions, a set of factor analyses have been performed. The results from two principal component analyses, one for the individual level data, and one for the aggregated level, are given in Table 1. In these analyses, the items have been recoded so that a higher score indicates a stronger preference for a religious impact on politics and public matters.

Table 1. Results from a varimax rotated principle component analysis of four items tapping views on the relationship between religion and politics. Data from the 1999/2000 wave from the EVS/WVS project in 38 countries. At the individual level, each national data set is weighted to yield 1.000 respondents. At the aggregated level, the national mean scores for each item is analyzed (n = 38).

Item:	Factor 1:		Factor 2:	
	Indiv. data	Aggr. data	Indiv. data	Aggr. data
A: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	.90	.97	.05	.20
C: It would be better for (one’s country), if more people with strong religious beliefs hold public office	.88	.98	.13	.14
B: Religious leaders should influence how people vote in elections	.06	.18	.88	.96
D: Religious leaders should influence government decisions	.12	.15	.87	.96
Explained variance:	48%	64%	31%	32%

The results support the assumption that statements A and C can be used to measure the degree to which people prefer religious people to be involved in public matters, and that statements B and

D can be used to measure the degree to which people accept that religious leaders try to influence politics. It should be noted that the factor structure is almost identical at the individual and the aggregated level. The four items can therefore be used for the analyses at each of these two levels. It should also be noted that a set of confirmatory factor analyses have not supported the suspicion that similar responses to statements B and D would be caused by the fact that both of them are negatively formulated.

Figure 1 (see next page) presents a scatterplot of the national means for the two dimensions of peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics. Several aspects of the scatterplot deserve attention. First, it should be noted that the means for the two items saying that religious leaders should influence political decisions (the vertical dimension in Figure 2) are comparatively low, ranging between 1.47 (France) and 2.40 (US). This indicates that in each country, it is only comparatively small numbers of people who accept that religious leaders try to influence political decisions and how people shall vote in general elections. This minority ranges from 2.2 percent in Portugal to 15.8 percent in Mexico. Accordingly, in each country large majorities seem to reject the idea that religious leaders should influence politics. By contrast, the means for the two items saying that religious people should hold public office are somewhat higher, ranging from 1.58 (Denmark) to 3.89 (Philippines). This kind of a religious impact on public matters is therefore seen as more acceptable. In the Philippines, it is even a majority of about 60 percent who agrees with each of the two statements saying that religious people should hold public office. In Argentina, Mexico, Ukraine, Chile, the US, Venezuela, Malta, and Greece, comparatively strong minorities between 20 to 40 percent are of the same opinion, whereas in the remaining 29 countries, this minority is considerably weaker, ranging below 10 percent. For all countries except Sweden, the preference for religious people to hold public office is higher than the readiness to accept that religious leaders influence political decisions. As expected from the varimax rotated factor analyses, the correlation between the two mean scores is low (at the individual level .25; at the aggregate .39).




Figure 1. Values for two dimensions of the relationship between religion and Politics. Data from the 1999/2000 EVS/WVS wave from 38 countries.

The scatterplot illustrates some further interesting differences between the 38 countries. One group of countries (Denmark, Belgium, and France) score low on both dimensions, while another group (Sweden and the Netherlands) seems to dislike that religious people hold public office, but to be comparatively less critical towards religious leaders who try to influence politics. A third group of countries (the US, South Africa, Venezuela, Ukraine, Greece, and the Philippines), score comparatively high on both dimensions of a religious influence on political and public matters, whereas a fourth group (Romania and Malta) demonstrate comparatively high likings for religious people to hold public office together with a certain dislike for religious leaders who try to influence political decisions. As already mentioned, the aim of this paper is to try explain these differences.

Since the 1991 ISSP module on religion also used the same four items, it is of interest to compare the ISSP results with the findings from the EVS/WVS data . However, the ISSP data were collected by a postal survey, and the EVS/WVS by face to face interviews. The comparison must therefore be made with care. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the factor structure of the ISSP data is almost identical to the factorial structure reported in Table 1. Thus, the four items seem to tap the same two latent variables in both surveys. Furthermore, for the 10 countries which participated in both surveys, the changes that took place between 1991 and 1999/2000 were mostly minor, except for the US. In this country, those who disagreed with the two statements saying that religious leaders should not influence political decisions increased from 10.8 percent to 15.8, while those who preferred religiously committed people to hold public office increased from 19.8 percent to 28.8. In the remaining 9 countries, the corresponding changes were mostly of a more modest size. From these comparisons, one may conclude that peoples' normative orientations towards a religious impact on politics and public matters seem to be fairly stable, both in terms of structure and levels. From the theoretical perspectives guiding this investigation, this is also to be expected.

Macro-level analyses

In a first set of analyses, the impact of secularization and postmodernization on peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics will be investigated by means of macro-level data only. For this purpose, measures of the degree of secularization and postmodernization in the 38 countries need first to be developed.

Independent variables: The degrees of secularization and postmodernization

In accordance with the introductory theoretical discussion, measures of the degree of secularization will be built on aggregated national indicators for the levels of religious involvement, while measures for the degree of postmodernization will be built on national indicators for the degrees of cultural pluralism. In this regard, the factor scores from a varimax rotated two-factor principal component analysis of four such macro-level indicators will be used. These four indicators are the following: 1) National means for how important God is in peoples' life, 2) national means for the degree of confidence people have in their church/the churches in their country, 3) national measures for the degree of cultural reflexivity, and 4) national measures for the degree of membership pluralism among social movements and voluntary associations. More detailed information on these indicators are given in the Appendix. That the

first two indicators can be used as measures of the general degree of secularization has been demonstrated by previous studies (Halman and Pettersson 1999, 2001). The use of the two remaining indicators as measures of postmodernization is motivated by the understanding of postmodern and /or late modern culture as reflexive with regard to peoples' world-views and pluralistic with regard to their memberships in social movements and ideological organizations. The results from a varimax rotated factor analysis of the 4 indicators, which are presented Table 2, demonstrate that they are related as assumed to secularization (i.e. the level of religious involvement) and postmodernization, respectively. This assumption is also partly supported by a confirmatory factor analysis. It should be noted that that the two factors are orthogonal in relation to each other. The implication is that a given country may score low on secularization and high on postmodernization and or vice versa. Thus, among the 38 countries included in this investigation, the levels of secularization and postmodernization are seen as principally independent of each other.

Table 2. Results from a varimax rotated principle component analysis of four items tapping the degree of secularization and postmodernization. Aggregated EVS/WVS data from the 1999/2000 wave in 38 countries.

	Factor 1 Seculari- zation	Factor 2 Postmoderni- zation
Importance God	.97	.07
Confidence in church(es)	.97	-.10
Reflexive culture	.01	.88
Organizational pluralism	.21	.88
Explained variance	48%	39%

In the following, the factor scores from the factor analysis presented in Table 2 will be used as indicators for the degrees of secularization and postmodernization. In this regard, the scores from the first factor will be reversed, so that a higher score mean lower levels of religious involvement. Among the 38 countries, the degree of postmodernization is positively related to the GDP(ppp) per capita ($r = .58$; $P < .001$), the percentage of male employees in the service sector ($r = .62$), the size of the internet sector ($r = .61$; $P < .001$), and negatively to the percentage

male employees in the agricultural sector ($r = -.55$; $P < .001$)³. Thus, postmodernization seems to be associated with the service and knowledge and information society. The degree of secularization is however not significantly related to these structural variables. The explanation may be that there is too little variation among the 38 countries in these regards. Another explanation might of course be that secularization (low levels of religious involvement) is primarily explained by other variables than these economical dimensions. Information on how the 38 countries score on the measures of secularization and postmodernization is given in Table 3 below.

The impact of secularization and postmodernization on peoples' views on the relation between religion and politics

As a first test of the assumption that secularization and postmodernization would drive in opposite directions with regard to peoples' normative views on the relation between religion and politics, a plain comparison between four groups of countries will be presented. The countries in these four groups differ on whether they score below or above the mean scores for the two measures of secularization and postmodernization, respectively. For the countries in each group, the means for the country percentages for those who have A) agreed with each of the two indicators saying that religiously involved should hold public office, and those who have B) disagreed with each of the two statements saying that religious leaders should not affect government decisions or how people vote in the political elections, will be presented. The results for these group comparisons are presented in Table 3 (see next page).

The assumption that secularization and postmodernization would drive in opposite directions with regard to the relationship between religion and politics, would be supported if for each level of postmodernization, the more secularized countries would demonstrate lower scores than the less secularized countries, and if for each level of secularization, the more postmodernized countries would demonstrate higher scores than the less postmodernized countries. All in all, Table 3 thus calls for 8 different comparisons. Of these, as many as 7 are in accordance with the theoretical expectations. The only exception is that in group 4, the mean percentage for those who prefer religiously committed persons to hold public office (5.0%) is not higher than the corresponding percentage for group 2. Admittedly being a rough test, the results of Table 3 can

³ Data for these structural variables are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank.

therefor be said to support the theoretical assumptions of a differential impact of secularization and postmodernization. Secularization appear to be associated with fewer preferences for a religious impact on politics, while postmodernization seems to be associated with more.

Table 3. Mean percentages for those who A) prefer religiously committed persons to hold public office and B) religious leaders to affect political decisions in four groups of countries. Results from the 1999/2000 EVS/WVS wave in 38 countries.

		Secularization:	
		Low	High
Postmodernization:	Low	Group 1 A: 22.4% B: 4.3%	Group 2 A: 12.4% B: 4.0%
	High	Group 3 A: 27.9% B: 10.2%	Group 4 A: 5.0% B: 7.0%

The mean percentages for each group are based on the following countries:
 Group 1: ARG, ITA, MLT, POL, PRT, ROM, UKR,
 Group 2: BGR, BLR, ESP, EST, FRA, HUN, LTU, LVA, RUS
 Group 3: CAN, CHL, GRC, HRV, IRL, MEX, PHL, SVK, US, VEN, ZAF
 Group 4: AUT, BEL, CZE, DEU, DNK, FIN, ISL, LUX, NLD, SWE, SVN

As a more detailed analysis of these assumptions, a set of multiple regression analyses have been performed. As independent and dependent variables, the same variables which were presented in Table 3 will be used, with the addition of four independent variables for the degree of economic development (gdp per capita), the percentage of employees in the service sector and the agricultural sectors, respectively, and the size of the internet sector (the number of internet hosts per 10.000 inhabitants) have been used. Because of their bivariate correlations with the degree of postmodernization mentioned above, the latter four variables are introduced as control variables. The results from these multiple regression analyses are shown in Table 4 (next page).

Also the more detailed results from the multiple regression analyses are quite in accordance with the hypothesis of a differential impact of secularization and postmodernization. The higher the degree of secularization, the fewer the preferences for religiously involved people to hold public office, and the stronger the dislike for religious leaders who try to influence political decisions. In the case of postmodernization, these relations are reversed.

Table 4. Results from two multiple regression analyses with two dimensions of views on the relationship between religion and politics as dependent variables, and the degrees of secularization, postmodernization, economic development, and the sizes of the service and agricultural sectors, respectively, as independent. Aggregated data for 38 countries. Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients.

	Relation between religion and politics:	
	Religious people should be active in politics	Religious leaders should influence politics
Secularized culture	-8.68 ***	- 1.31 *
Postmodern culture	3.69 ^a	2.55 **
GDP per capita	-0.00	-0.00
Size Service sector	0.23	0.02
Size Agricultural sector	0.55	-0.13
Size Internet	-0.01	0.01
Multiple R	.89 ***	.77 ***

^a p < .06; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Thus, the results from the multiple regression analyses of macro-level data have yielded empirical support for the assumption that secularized and postmodern cultures drive in the opposite directions with regard to peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and politics. However, one may also note a tendency for postmodernization to have a stronger positive impact on peoples' views on the efforts by religious leaders to influence political processes, and secularization to have a stronger impact on peoples' preferences for religiously involved people to hold public office. Thus, the results suggest that the two dimensions of peoples' normative views on the relation between religion and politics may be differently related to secularization and postmodernization. Such an outcome was not assumed in the introductory theoretical discussion.

A combined micro- and macro-level analysis

However, peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and politics would most likely not only depend on whether the cultural system in which they live is secularized and/or postmodern, but also on their individual value orientations, their education, their age and gender, etc. And since peoples' value orientations may be related to the degrees of secularization and postmodernization, respectively, the relationships found in the macro-level analyses may be spurious. Therefore, an analysis which also takes these micro-level factors into account may

shed further light on peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics. In order to perform such an analysis, measures for peoples' basic value orientations must first be developed.

Two basic value orientations

Previous comparative research on the EVS/WVS data has often focused on two basic value dimensions. The first is the "traditional versus the secular rational value orientation", where "the authority of God, Fatherland and Family are all closely linked" (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 25; cf. Inglehart 1997: Chap. 3). The second is the "survival versus the self-expression value orientation", which taps a syndrome of "trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and self-expression" (ibid). These two basic dimensions have been shown to correlate with key macro- and micro-level characteristics (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000), for instance with economic development and the size of the industrial and the knowledge and service sectors at the macro-level, and with age, gender and education at the micro-level. Based on considerations from previous analyses (Pettersson 2001, 2002), this investigation will use a modified version of these two value dimensions. This can be shortly described as follows.

The *traditional value orientation* taps attachment to religious and traditional family values together with experiences of national identity. The measure of religious values is assessed by a composite score from two components, one concerning the importance of religion, and the other whether one thinks that the churches are giving adequate answers to man's moral, spiritual, social, and family problems. The measure of traditional family values is calculated as a composite score from two components, one concerning how important one finds the family to be in one's life, and the other one's adherence to a set of traditional opinions on family life, for instance strict parent-child relations, formal marriage as a basis for family, etc. The measure of national identity taps one's sense of national pride and national belonging. Detailed information on the items which are used as indicators for the traditional value orientation is given in the Appendix.

The *civic orientation* is measured by a postmaterialism index, a social capital index, and an index tapping protest proneness. Even if a number of definitions of civic culture and the civic society have been proposed (see e.g. Inglehart 1997: Chap 6; Weintraub 1997), these three aspects are often regarded as prominent dimensions of civic involvement. The postmaterialism index taps the degree to which the respondents prefer postmaterialist views on the way society should be organized (Inglehart 1990, 1997). The social capital index is built on two components,

one concerning social trust, and the other involvement in social networks, formal as well as informal (cf. Putnam 2000). The measure of protest proness taps the willingness to engage in various forms of social protests like signing a petition, joining a boycott, etc. Detailed information on the items which are used to measure the civic orientation is given in the Appendix.

In order to investigate whether this model for the two basic value dimensions is also applicable to the data set for the 38 countries which is used in this investigation, two factor analyses have been performed, one for the individual data level, and one for the aggregated.. The results from these analyses are presented in Table 5. The results demonstrate that the six indicators relate as expected to the two value dimensions.

Table 5. Results from a varimax rotated principle component analysis of six indicators tapping traditional values and civic involvement. Data from the 1999/2000 wave from the EVS/WVS project in 38 countries. At the individual level, each national data set is weighted to yield 1.000 respondents and a total n of 38.000. At the aggregated level, the national mean scores for each item is analyzed (n = 38).

	Factor 1:		Factor 2:	
	Indiv. data	Aggr. data	Indiv. data	Aggr. data
Religious values	.74	.85	-.09	-.12
Family values	.70	.86	-.21	-.29
National identity	.55	.67	.15	.44
Postmaterialism	-.09	.01	.66	.88
Social capital	.25	.02	.68	.88
Protest proness	-.24	-.36	.69	.83
Explained variance	28%	31%	21%	45%

Previous research on the 1990 EVS and the 1996 WVS data from about 60 countries has demonstrated that each of the two basic value orientations is correlated to the degree of economic development (GDP per capita), and that in addition the traditional values are negatively related to the size of the industrial sector, while the civic orientation is positively correlated to the size of the service sector (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Similar relations can be found for the 1999/2000 EVS/WVS data analyzed in this paper. The traditional values are positively related to the size of the agricultural sector (the agricultural production as percentage of the GDP), and negatively to the GDP per capita (World Bank figures for 1998). Although not

statistically significant, these correlation coefficients are .26 and -.25, respectively. By contrast, the civic orientation is significantly and positively related to both the GDP per capita and the size of the service sector (the service sector as percentage of the GDP). The correlation coefficients are .75 and .45, respectively. The civic orientation is also positively related to higher levels of education (net enrollment in tertiary education; $r = .52$). It should also be noted that at the individual level, traditional values are positively related to age and negatively to education, while the corresponding relations for the civic orientation are reversed.

With regard to the two basic value orientations, it is not self-evident which impact these would have on peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and politics. In the case of the traditional value orientation, the religious component may of course be assumed to favor a religious impact on political issues. However, the probable impact of the remaining two components (the family values, and the national identity, respectively) is less obvious. Therefore, the most likely impact of the traditional value orientation is difficult to predict. A similar conclusion is likely in the case of the civic orientation. Since this orientation is secular in its basic premises, this orientation may plausibly be associated with a dislike of religious influences on politics. However, the civic orientation also favors independent individuals to follow their basic preferences, whatever these may be. From this point of view, one may expect the civic value orientation to demonstrate higher tolerance for various efforts to accomplish a religious influence on politics.

In summary then, it seems difficult to arrive at any well grounded assumptions on how the two basic value orientations would affect peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics. The same can be said with regard to peoples' socio-economic background. Generally, one would however expect the younger, the better educated and the males to be more in favor of a clear-cut differentiation between religion and public matters. This follows from previous research on the religious involvement of people from different social strata (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; Pettersson 1994). Disregarding the rather imprecise propositions on how the two basic value orientations and peoples' socio-economic background would affect their views on the relationship between religion and politics, a third assumption of this investigation is nevertheless that these micro-level factors would have an impact, and therefore be necessary to include as controls for the macro-level influences.

A multilevel analysis of peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics

As demonstrated in the macro-level analyses, secularization seemed to yield opposition against a religious impact on politics, while postmodernization can be expected to drive in the opposite direction and to yield support for a religious impact on politics. However, since peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics are also be assumed to depend on their basic value orientations and their socio-economic background, multi-level analyses, taking both of the macro and the micro-level factors into account are necessary.

In the subsequent empirical analyses, the combined effects of the macro- and micro-level factors will be investigated, using the HLM program which enables the estimation of the simultaneous effects of both micro- and macro-level independent variables on the individual level dependent variables. These effects are estimated by so called multi-level hierarchical regression analyses (see e.g. Raudenbush and Bruk 2002; Hox 1995). As dependent micro-level variables for these analyses, similar scores as those which were used in the macro-level regression analyses described above have been used. One score taps views on whether religiously involved people should hold public office or not. Those who agreed with each of the two indicators saying that religiously involved people should hold public office (statements A and C) received a score of 2, while those who didn't agree with any of them got a score of 0. The second score concerns opinions on whether religious leaders should affect politics or not. Those who disagreed with each of the two statements saying that religious leaders should not affect government decisions or how people vote in the political elections (statements B and D) received a score of 2, while those who didn't disagree with any got a score of 0. As independent micro-level variables, the factor scores for the two basic value orientations will be used, together with the measures for age, education, and gender described in the Appendix. As independent macro-level factors, the same measures which were used in the macro-level analysis described above will be used (the measures the degrees of secularization, postmodernization, and economic development (GDP per capita), respectively). The results from the hierarchical regression analyses are reported in Table 6 (next page).

The results of the multi-level regression analyses demonstrate that the inclusion of the two basic value orientations, together with age, gender, and education, support the tendency which was noted in the analyses of the macro-level data, and which suggested that secularization and postmodernization may be differently related to the two different dimensions of a religious impact on politics. Thus, the preferences for religiously committed persons to hold public office

seems to be mainly affected by the degree of secularization, while in contrast, the tolerance for religious leaders who try to affect political decisions seems to be mainly related to postmodernization. In this more specified sense, then, secularization would cause fewer preferences for a religious impact on politics and public matters, while postmodernization would yield a greater tolerance for efforts to accomplish such an effect. The multilevel hierarchical regression analyses further demonstrate that, in addition to the impact of the macro-level factors, the various micro-level factors also appear to influence peoples' views on the relationship between religion and politics. Those who are older and who adhere to the traditional value orientation are more in favor of each of the two kinds of a religious impact on politics. The better educated are less positive towards religiously committed people holding public office, while they are more tolerant towards religious leaders who try to affect political decisions. In a similar manner, those who favor the civic orientation are less positive towards religiously committed people holding public office. Finally, it should be noted that in the case of attitudes towards political leaders who try to affect political decisions, postmodernization and traditional values seem to work in the same direction. This is somehow a contra-intuitive result, which may be explained by a differential impact of the three components of the traditional value orientation (cf. the above discussion on this).

Table 6. Results from two multi-level hierarchical linear regression analyses of factors affecting people's normative views on two kinds of a religious impact on politics. Entries are unstandardized multi-level regression coefficients. The analyses are built on 1999-2000 EVS/WVS data for 40.449 respondents from 38 countries.

	Religious people should hold public office	Religious leaders should influence political decisions
<i>Micro-level factors:</i>		
Traditional values	.21***	.06***
Civic orientation	-.04***	.00
Age	.00***	.00*
Gender	.07***	.00
Education	-.00***	.01**
<i>Macro-level factors:</i>		
GDP per capita	-.00*	-.00
Secularized culture	-.14***	-.02
Postmodern culture	.06	.07*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .000$

In addition to the results reported in Table 6, another feature of the outcomes from the multi-level regression analyses deserve attention. This feature concerns how much the various independent variables explain of the variation in the dependent. In ordinary regression analyses, the usual measure for this is the squared multiple regression coefficient. In the case of multi-level hierarchical analyses, there is however no single clear-cut equivalent of this measure (Sniders and Boskers 1999: chap 7; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 115ff). Analyses of the proportional reductions in the estimated variance components at the macro- and micro-levels, respectively, yield however the following estimates. In the case of preferences for religiously committed persons to hold public office, the three macro-level factors reduce about 37 percent of the variation between countries ($p < .01$), while the 5 micro-level factors reduce about 12 percent of the variation at this level ($p < .001$). The corresponding percentages for the tolerance for religious leaders who try to influence political decisions are 37 percent ($p < .001$) and two percent ($p < .01$), respectively. In a general sense, these results indicate that the macro- and micro-level independent variables which are analyzed in this investigation, in most instances account for a not unsubstantial part of the variance in peoples' views on a religious impact on politics and public matters.

Summary conclusion

In this paper, peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and politics are assumed to depend on the degrees of both secularization and postmodernization, as well as on peoples' basic value orientations and their socio-economic background. In these regards, the assumptions were founded on three theoretical perspectives: 1) A traditional secularization approach, which assumed preferences for a religious impact on politics to be less frequent in the more secularized societies, 2) an approach which was based on a combination of theories on the impact of religious pluralism and postmodernization, respectively, and which assumed positive attitudes towards a religious impact on politics to be more frequent, the more postmodern the cultural context, and 3) an approach which was based on value research and which assumed that peoples' basic value orientations and their socio-economic background would also have an impact, although this was difficult to specify in detail

In the empirical analyses of these assumptions, a data set from the 1999/2000 EVS/WVS projects in 38 Western countries with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage was used. These data allowed investigations of two different orientations towards the relationship between

religion and politics. One orientation concerned whether people found it better if religiously committed persons hold public offices, while the other tapped whether people tolerated that religious leaders try to affect political decisions, either in government or with regard to peoples' voting preferences. The results from a set of macro-level analyses showed that both of these orientations towards a religious impact on politics and public matters were related as expected to the degrees of secularization and postmodernization. The more secularized the context, the less people were in favor of a religious impact on politics and public matters, while the more postmodern the context, the more people were in favor of such an impact. A set of multilevel hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated a more differentiated pattern in these regards. The degree of secularization appeared to be primarily related to negative views towards religiously committed persons holding public office, while the degree of postmodernization was primarily related to the tolerance for religious leaders who try to influence political decisions. Thus, secularization would yield a dislike for public matters to be infused by the views of religiously committed persons, while postmodernization would provide increased tolerance for religious spokesmen who try to affect politics in accordance with their views.

The assumption that postmodern or late modern characteristics such as cultural reflexivity and pluralism among social movements and voluntary associations should be associated with positive attitudes towards a religious impact on politics, was derived from the much debated rational choice influenced "supply side theory" of religious involvement. In this regard, the results have demonstrated that this theoretical perspective has bearings in other areas than have hitherto been investigated. However, it was not only the assumptions from this theoretical perspective which received support from the empirical analyses, but also the expectations from secularization theory. Therefore, the findings suggest that secularization theory and supply side theory may not be so mutually exclusive as is often claimed, at least when it comes to the relationship between religion and political matters. Indeed, the two paradigms may actually be complementary. Perhaps neither of them should be taken to "the graveyard of failed theories"!

With regard to the impact of the two micro-level value orientations, the traditional value orientation appeared to be positively related to each of the two kinds of a religious impact on politics, while the civic orientation was related to a dislike for religiously involved people to hold public office. Even if these results seem more or less self-evident, they deserve attention as yet another evidence of the general scope and relevance of the two basic value orientations. However, in this regard, there was one contra-intuitive finding which deserves attention. The

results suggested that postmodernization and traditional values seem to work in the *same* direction in the case of religious leaders influencing political decisions. To the degree that religious values are parts of the traditional values, this is also to be expected from the general assumption that postmodernization would have a positive impact on religious participation and pro-religious attitudes.

Another part of the results which deserves attention is that the findings hardly demonstrated any widespread preferences for religion to be a potent actor in the public and political realm. Rather, the results demonstrated that in most countries, comparatively large majorities seemed to reject a religious influence on politics and public matters. A similar pattern has been supported by two other datasets. When the so called RAMP project⁴ asked people in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, whether the main religions should have an influence on politics or not, large majorities were of the opinion that they should not. The data from the 1991 ISSP module on religion demonstrated similar findings. These results are of obvious interest in relation to recent claims that the contemporary religions refuse to accept the marginal and privatized role, which theories of secularization and modernization have reserved for them (Casanova 1994) . The data which are discussed in this paper hardly support such claims, at least not as far as ordinary grass root orientations towards a religious impact on politics and public matters are concerned. Rather, the results seem to support the privatization thesis.

However, in this regard, a set of preliminary findings are of interest, although a detailed discussion of them has to be postponed to a later investigation. Thus, it deserves attention that the EVS/WVS data reveal a tendency for the various national minorities who prefer a religious impact on politics to be slightly less in favor of a democratic rule and to be more in favor for the political parties to the right. Furthermore, in some countries, these minorities showed to be slightly more ethnocentric, and they appeared more inclined to see the state as the prime responsible for satisfying individual needs. And finally, in most countries, these minorities were more negative towards abortion and euthanasia, while they did differ with regard to their views towards tax evasion and cheating on social benefits. Thus, even if it is minorities who prefer a

⁴ For more information on the project on Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP), see the 2002 issue of *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion* , which includes several contributions on this project.

religious impact on politics, these minorities seem to gather in certain corners of the political landscape. Because of this, they may gain a political influence beyond their sheer numbers.

Obviously, the analyses presented in this investigation need critical examination in several regards. To mention just one of these, it should be noted that the questions which have been used to tap orientations towards a religious impact on politics did not distinguish between *different kinds* of political issues or public matters. Rather, they asked for views on a religious impact on politics and public offices in general. Had one however asked more detailed questions for a religious influence on specific political issues, for instance with regard to the so called policies of extraction and distribution, the results may well have been different (cf. Minkenberg 2002 and the preliminary findings mentioned above). In future investigations, this issue out to be attended.

In summary, it can therefore be concluded that safer cross-cultural conclusions about peoples' normative views on the relationship between religion and public and political matters call for continued investigations of this topic. The results which have been reported in this analysis have however demonstrated that such investigations may be of great interest, not the least with regard to the possibly differential impact of secularization and postmodernization. In continued research on this topic, it would certainly be of great interest to investigate whether the positive impact of postmodernization also holds for other components of religious involvement such as church membership, service attendance, religious beliefs, etc. In an increasingly globalized and postmodern world, this would be a key issue for religious studies to investigate.

Appendix: Countries

The 38 countries included in this investigation and their sample sizes are the following:
Argentina (ARG) 1280, Austria (AUT) 1552, Belarus (BLR) 1000, Belgium (BEL) 1912, Bulgaria (BGR) 1000, Canada (CAN) 1931, Chile ((CHL) 1200, Croatia (HRV) 1003, Czech Republic (CZE) 1908, Denmark (DNK) 1023, Estonia (EST) 1005, Finland (FIN) 1038, France (FRA) 1616, Germany (DEU) 2036, Greece (GRC) 1142, Hungary (HUN) 1000, Iceland (ISL) 968, Ireland (IRL) 1012, Italy (ITA) 2000, Latvia (LVA) 1013, Lithuania (LTU) 1018, Luxemburg (LUX) 1211, Malta (MLT) 1002, Mexico (MEX) 1535, Netherlands (NLD) 1003, Phillipines (PHL) 1200, Poland (POL) 1095, Portugal (PRT) 1000, Romania (ROM) 1146,

Russia (RUS) 2500, Slovakia (SVK) 1331, Slovenia (SVN) 1006, South Africa (ZAF) 3000, Spain (ESP) 1200, Sweden (SWE) 1015, Ukraine (UKR) 1195, United States (USA) 1200, and Venezuela (VEN) 1200.

Appendix: Measurements

A) *The traditional value orientation* is measured by three indicators: Religious values, traditional family values, and national identity. The religious values are measured by two components. The first concerns how important religion is in one's life, and is measured by a rating scale with response alternatives ranging from "not very important at all" (value 1) to "very important" (value 4). The second component concerns whether one finds that the churches/the religious leaders/the religious authorities give adequate answers to "the moral problems and needs of the individual", "the problems of family life", "people's spiritual needs", and "the social problems facing our country today". From the answers to these four questions, a "church adequacy score" can be calculated (cf. Halman and Vloet 1994). Those who find that each of the issues is given an adequate answer receive a score of 4, while those who find that none of them is given an adequate answer receive a score of 0. The two components of religious values (the importance of religion, and church adequacy, respectively) are then added into a single measure of religious values, ranging from 1 to 8.

The measure of family values is likewise calculated as the sum of two different components. The first concerns how important family is in one's life, and is measured by a rating scale ranging from "not very important at all" (value 1) to "very important" (value 4). The second concerns five different expressions of traditional family values. These concern whether one thinks that "one must always love and respect one's parents, irrespective of their qualities and faults", that "it is the parents' duties to do their best for their children, even at the expense of their own well-being", that marriage is not "an outdated institution", that "a child needs a home with both a father and a mother in order to grow up happily", together with a dislike of "a woman who wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relation with a man". Those who adhere to each of these 5 views receive a score of 5, while those who support none of them receive a score of 0. The two components of family values (the importance of family, and traditional family values, respectively) are then added into a single measure of traditional family values, ranging from 1 to 9.

The measure of national identity is assessed by two components. One taps the respondents' degree of national pride and is decided from a question about how proud one is to be "Swedish", "Mexican", etc. The answers are given on a four point rating scale, ranging from "not at all proud" (value 1) to "very proud" (value 4). The second component concerns the degree to which one feels that one belongs to one's country. This component is assessed from two questions on whether one feels that one belongs first of all or in the second place to "the locality where one lives", "the region", "one's country", "the continent where one lives" (e.g. Europe, South America etc), and "the world as a whole". Those who choose "one's country" in the first place receive a score of 2, those who choose "one's country" in the second place receive a score of 1, while those who don't choose this alternative at all receive a score of 0. The two components of national identity (national pride, and national belonging, respectively), are then added into a single measure of national identity, ranging from 1 to 6.

B) The civic orientation is measured by a postmaterialism index, a social capital index, and an index tapping protest proness. The postmaterialism index asks the respondents to choose the most and the second most important from the following four opinions: maintaining order in the nation, fighting rising prices (materialist items), giving people more say, and protecting freedom of speech (postmaterialist items). The index ranges from materialist views (value 1) to postmaterialist views (value 4). The social capital index is made up of two components, one concerning social trust, and one concerning involvement in social networks. The component of social trust is measured by two questions. One asks whether most people can be trusted, or if one needs to be very careful in dealing with others. The other asks if it is important or not to show other people respect and tolerance. The answers to these two questions are combined into one measure for social trust, ranging between 0 and 2. The component of social networks is measured by two indicators, one for informal social connectedness, and one for formal. The indicator for informal connectedness is based on four items, which ask how often one spends time with friends, with colleagues outside the workplace, with people belonging to one's church, mosque, or synagogue, and with co-members in clubs and voluntary associations. The answers are collapsed into one single measure, ranging from 0 to 4. Those who say that they meet regularly each month with each of the four categories, receive a score of 4, while those who say that they do not, get a score of 0. The indicator for formal social relations is assessed by a set of questions which ask whether one does voluntary work in 14 different organizations and social movements (cf. the measure for the degree of pluralism in the various voluntary associations). The score for formal social relations is simply calculated as the number of organizations in

which one is doing voluntary work. In order to get a combined score for social networks, the measures of formal and informal civil connectedness are then added. Since the score for the formal relations can reach a substantially higher number than the score for informal connectedness, the two scores are given equal weight by transforming each to a simple dichotomy, with values 0 and 1 and above. In order to achieve an over-all measure for social capital, the scores for social trust and social networks are then added. This score ranges between 0 and 4.

The degree of protest proness is assessed by a battery of five questions. These ask whether one “has done”, “can imagine to do”, or would “never do” each of the following five acts: Sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a lawful demonstration, join an unofficial strike, and occupy a building or factory. The measure of protest proness captures how many of these acts the respondents has been involved in or can imagine to do. Thus, the index ranges between 0 and 5. The index has proven valid in previous value research (cf. Halman and Vloet 1994).

As independent variables at the micro-level, age, education and gender will also be used. Education is measured by one question asking at what age one finished/will finish one’s education. Admittedly, this is a very crude measure of the degree of education. However, more nuanced measures, taking each country’s specific education system into account, would infringe on cross-country comparability.

Macro-level measures of secularization and postmodernization

In order to tap the degree of secularization (the degree of religious involvement) two indicators will be used. These are the national means for three questions in the EVS/WVS questionnaire: 1) How important is God in your life? (1 = not important at all; 10 = very important), and 2) What confidence do you have in your church//the churches in this country? (1 = none at all; 4 = a great deal). Previous studies have found this kind of items to make efficient measures of the general level of secularization (Halman and Pettersson 1999, 2001).

In order to tap the degree of postmodernization, the following two indicators will be used: 1) The degree of cultural reflexivity, and 2) the degree of pluralism among the various social movements and voluntary associations. These variables are operationalized as follows. The measure of cultural reflexivity is obtained as factor scores from a principal component analysis of the aggregated national means for the following four items in the EVS/WVS questionnaire: 1)

The degree of freedom one experiences in one's life (measured by a 10-point scale ranging from 1 = none at all to 10 = a great deal), 2) a dichotomous item on whether one thinks or not that there are universal guidelines for good and evil, which are applicable everywhere, and 3) a dichotomous item on whether one regards fantasy and imagination to be an important quality to teach children, and 4) a dichotomous item on whether one regards independence to be an important quality to teach children. Of course, other indicators of cultural reflexivity might be preferred, but these items are the best available, and they can be said to constitute often recognized ingredients of cultural reflexivity.

With regard to the level of pluralism among the various social movements and voluntary associations, two different dimensions deserve attention. These are the number of associations, and the distribution of "market shares" among them, respectively. The more associations and the more evenly distributed their market shares, the more diversified and plural this sector. This kind of pluralism is often measured by a pluralism index, which is based on the Herfindahl concentration index. The concentration index is defined as $H = \sum s_i^2$, where s_i is the market share of association I , that is the number of persons affiliated with association I divided by the total number of persons affiliated with any association. Data on the number of people associated with the various associations in a country is simply taken from a battery on this issue in the EVS/WVS questionnaires. The battery asked if the respondents were members in any of the following 14 kinds of associations: Social welfare associations, religious associations, cultural associations, trade unions, political parties, local community associations, third world and human rights oriented associations, ecological associations, professional associations, associations for youth work, sports associations, associations for woman, peace oriented associations, associations oriented on health issues. The more even the distribution of memberships among them, the lower the Herfindahl index and the more pluralistic (less concentrated) the religious sector. Therefore, the index for pluralism among the voluntary associations can be calculated as $1 - \text{the Herfindahl concentration index for this sector}$.

As macro-level control variables, the following have been used: The GDP per capita, the degree of higher education, the size of the internet sector (the number of internet hosts by 10.000 inhabitants), the number of male employees in the service sector, and the number of employees in the agricultural sector. Data for these indicators are from the 2001 World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank.

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