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Social Capital, Voluntary Associations and Collective Action: Which Aspects of Social Capital Have the Greatest ‘Civic’ Payoff?

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ABSTRACT *Despite a great variety of theoretical approaches, empirical analyses of social capital are surprisingly similar. Virtually all of them treat membership in voluntary associations as the chief indicator of community involvement while neglecting another form of community involvement: participation in elite-challenging actions. Likewise, authors readily attribute manifold civic benefits to associational life, while hesitating to attribute such benefits to elite-challenging activity. We question these views on two grounds. Firstly, we argue that elite-challenging action reflects social capital, even though this is a specific form of it: an emancipative form typical of self-assertive publics. Secondly, we use data from the Value Surveys to demonstrate that elite-challenging action is linked with greater civic benefits, at both the individual and societal level, than is membership in voluntary associations. This finding confirms the concept of human development, which suggests that emancipative forms of social capital are more civic in their consequences than others. Following this concept, we show that mass self-expression values nurture emancipative social capital, in motivating elite-challenging action. Finally, we locate self-expression values and elite-challenging actions in a theory of emancipative social capital.*

KEY WORDS: Social capital, voluntary associations, collective action, civil society, civic governance, civic values

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Introduction

Thanks to Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 2000), few concepts in the social sciences have become as prominent in recent years as social capital. The popularity of this concept is understandable. It offers a universal answer to the basic question of all social sciences (Ostrom, 1994; Levi, 1996): what keeps societies together and leads individuals to act for collective goals?

In contrast to the richness of theoretical approaches, empirical studies of social capital are surprisingly similar in an important aspect (Roberts & Roche, 2001; van Deth, 2003). When it comes to tackle people's community involvement, all comparative studies of social capital focus on membership in voluntary associations, such as charity organizations, environmental organizations, professional organizations or educational organizations. Admittedly, supposedly civic attitudes, such as interpersonal trust and trustworthiness, are used as indicators of social capital as well (see Putnam, 1993, 2000; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Newton & Norris, 2000; Newton, 2001; Hardin, 2002; Norris, 2002; Paxton, 2002). But civic attitudes are not accepted as indicators of social capital among scholars who follow Coleman (1990) in insisting that social capital should be defined as referring only to community networks and not psychological attributes (Edwards & Foley, 1998; Jackman & Miller, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Lin, 2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2002).

Consequently, involvement in voluntary associations remains the only empirical indicator on which all analysts of social capital agree. Indeed, every comparative study of social capital of which we are aware, uses membership in associations as the core indicator of community ties. Association membership stays most unchallenged in the center of social capital studies (among others see Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2002; Dekker & van den Broek, 1996; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Wessels, 1997; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Rose, 2000; Gibson, 2001; Newton, 2001; Mutz, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Norris, 2002; Stolle, 2003; Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2004; Dekker *et al.*, 2004).

The emphasis placed on membership in voluntary associations shows a fixation on institutionalized forms of community involvement. Participation in non-institutionalized forms of community involvement, such as boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and petitions, plays a minor role.¹ To be sure, non-institutionalized actions are distinct from institutionalized ones by their 'challenging' nature, as they confront decision-makers with demands from 'below'. But their elite-challenging thrust does not disqualify non-institutionalized actions as a form of community involvement. They *are* a form of community involvement. Yet, studies to date have been reluctant in examining elite-challenging actions as a manifestation of social capital. This is not to say that there are no studies of elite-challenging actions at all. Quite the contrary, the literature on 'unconventional' participation (Barnes *et al.*, 1979; Roller & Wessels, 1996; Dalton, 2002, 2004; Norris, 2002; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2003; Catterberg, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) and on social movements and protest mobilization focuses on exactly these forms of citizen activity (McAdam, 1986, 2003; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam *et al.*, 2001). Still, these studies follow entirely different theoretical approaches, none of which considers elite-challenging action as a form of social capital. We are aware of no comparative study that specifies the relevance of elite-challenging mass action for social capital.

Membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging action are also seen in a different normative light. Since de Tocqueville (1994, originally published 1837) scholars attribute various civic benefits to voluntary associations, seeing them as the

schools of deliberation in which people learn to cooperate, acquire civic skills (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 322) and adopt such civic orientations as trust and tolerance (Etzioni, 1993; Bellah *et al.*, 1996; Uslaner, 2002a). In the same vein, it has been claimed that widespread membership in voluntary associations makes institutions more ‘civic’—that is, more responsive and accountable to the citizens (Putnam, 1993, 2000).

The excessively favorable evaluation of voluntary associations did not escape criticism. Rosenblum (1998), Warren (2001), Fung (2003), Stolle (2003) and others argue that whether voluntary associations are beneficial depends on the type of association in question. One does not have to refer to such extreme examples as the Ku Klux Klan to realize that associations can be inherently ‘uncivic’. This insight has led to various typologies, most of which agree that rather open associations with an orientation toward the public good are more beneficial than exclusive ones that pursue solely group-specific goals (Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Paxton, 1999; Narayan & Cassidy, 2001; Rossteutscher & van Deth, 2002; Stolle, 2003). Still, empirical studies of social capital treat associational life as the key form of community involvement, neglecting elite-challenging activity.

The readiness with which scholars attribute civic benefits to voluntary associations contrasts with an apparent hesitation to attribute such benefits to elite-challenging mass action. It is even postulated that rising elite-challenging actions *undermine* social capital (Putnam, 2000), one of the reasons being that participation in such ‘turbulent’ activities as protests and boycotts goes at the expense of people’s commitment to ‘orderly’ associations (for an overview about the decline of social capital debate, see Stolle & Hooghe, 2004). Viewing elite-challenging mass actions as a corrosive force has a long tradition, going back to deprivation theories that see these actions as indications of alienation, malfunctions and civic misery. But deprivation theories have an inherent weakness as they tend to blur the distinction between collective violence and civil protest activities, explaining both as an outbreak of frustration-aggression mechanisms (Gurr, 1970; Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Muller, 1979). The neglect of the categorical distinction between violent and civilian forms of spontaneous mass action (Useem, 1998) was already evident in an early study by Huntington (1968) who argued that mass actions that are not channeled through formal organizations undermine social order, endanger democracy and hinder efficient governance. This view was revitalized when Crozier *et al.* (1975) claimed that the rise of protest politics in advanced Western democracies was producing a ‘crisis of democracy’. Although this view was disputed by the Political Action group (Barnes *et al.*, 1979; Jennings & van Deth, 1989), it continues to influence recent analyses such as *What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). There remains a tendency to attribute seemingly negative developments, such as the declining membership of traditional associations, to the corrosive effects of rising elite-challenging activities.

We question these views on conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, we will outline why we see no justification to exclude elite-challenging actions from the analysis of social capital. Empirically, we demonstrate that the tendency to attribute civic benefits to associational life but not to elite-challenging activity is mistaken. Finally, we clarify the relevance of our findings for the theory of social capital.

Conceptual Considerations

Membership in voluntary associations involves commitments to formal organizations. This helps fostering lasting group bonds that can become rather closely-knit. By contrast,

participation in elite-challenging actions is situation-specific. For most participants such actions are an opportunity to express concerns on an issue in which they are interested. This helps shaping issue communities that are rather loosely-knit but exactly because of this are able to bridge group-circles. Though not mutually exclusive, membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging actions are distinct forms of community involvement. However, we doubt that this distinction justifies to treat only membership in voluntary associations but not participation in elite-challenging action as a manifestation of social capital. An examination of prevailing definitions of social capital clarifies this point.

It has been said that social capital is a collective resource, not an individual one (Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Norris, 2002). As Newton (2001, p. 207) puts it, "if social capital is anything, it is a societal not an individual property". Similarly, Norris (2002, p. 139) notes that "societies can be rich in social capital but individuals cannot". But these statements are debatable (Inkeles, 2000, p. 247; van Deth, 2003, p. 84). Loury (1977) and Bourdieu (1986), for example, define social capital as the connections that individuals use to pursue their personal goals. As Lin (2001) puts it, individuals invest in social contacts in order to gain access to 'socially embedded resources' (for similar views, see Burt, 1992, p. 13; Portes, 1998, p. 8). Thus, one individual can have more social capital than another one, if s/he has more useful ties to the community. Coleman (1988, 1990), too, based his definition of social capital on people's connectedness. But like Granovetter (1973) and other network analysts, Coleman was interested in the *collective* benefits of interpersonal connections. He considered networks and ties also as a collective resource that *enables* people to engage in joint actions for common goals (Ostrom, 1994; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003).

Referring to Jacobs' (1961) work on urban networks, Putnam (1993, p. 167) added a motivational component to the notion of social capital: norms and values that *stimulate* people to engage in collective action (Fukuyama, 2001; Uslaner, 2002a, b; van Deth, 2002). This addition, however, is not unanimously accepted. The network school restricts social capital to the webs of contacts that make collective action possible (Burt, 1992; Flap, 1995; Kenworthy, 1997; Jackman & Miller, 1998; Edwards & Foley, 1998; Szeiter & Woolcock, 2002). Still, *collective action* is the central reference point in *any* definition of social capital, whether it includes motivational aspects or not (Woolcock, 1998, 2002; Inkeles, 2000; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; Passy, 2003).

Given that most theories see the central importance of social capital in its function to produce collective action, there is no conceptual justification to exclude elite-challenging action from the study of social capital. For elite-challenging action is a form of collective action. In fact, the frequency of elite-challenging action is a direct measure of social capital's productivity (in terms of producing collective action).

Neither membership in voluntary associations nor participation in elite-challenging actions measure community networks themselves (the very basis of social capital for many theorists). But both are valuable proxies, reflecting the existence and operation of community nets. That this is true for voluntary associations has been emphasized many times. But it is no less true for elite-challenging actions. Social movement research has repeatedly shown that initiating mass actions requires networks; and that mobilizing people into these actions operates via networks as well (McAdam, 1986, 2003; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam *et al.*, 2001). Hence, elite-challenging actions reflect all but the operation of communal networks. More precisely, elite-challenging actions indicate the effectiveness of networks in producing collective action. Even in a strict network perspective

there is no conceptual reason to exclude elite-challenging actions from the study of social capital.

If conceptual reasons do not suffice to disregard elite-challenging action, perhaps normative reasons do. Possibly, elite-challenging action does not reflect such a desirable form of social capital as many forms of associational life are supposed to do. Here the distinction between 'civic' and 'uncivic' forms of social capital becomes crucial. *Some* form of social capital is inevitably present in any society—otherwise the society would be devoid of cohesion, which means it would not be a society. But social capital can be present in different forms, not all of which are equally civic. Even favoritism, nepotism and corruption are manifestations of social capital, as each of these phenomena involves ties, connections and some form of collective action (Levi, 1996; Rose, 2000). But these 'dark' forms of social capital are 'uncivic' because they solely benefit the ingroup. For this reason, social capital theorists are particularly interested in 'civic' forms of social capital—that is, forms of social capital that benefit the wider citizenry (Rose, 2000).

However, the interest in specifically civic forms of social capital does not justify the exclusion of elite-challenging actions all together. Rather, it requires separating uncivic from civic forms of collective action. Violent forms of collective action, such as rebellions, riots and plunder, are uncivic—just as terrorist, criminal and extremist associations are uncivic. But civilian forms of collective action, including peaceful demonstrations, boycotts and petitions, cannot be disqualified as uncivic right from the start. Whether they bring civic benefits for the society as a whole and whether they do this to a lower or greater extent than voluntary associations is an open question that has to be examined empirically. So far this has not been done on a broadly comparative basis.

This study tries to fill this gap. To do this, we first look at the relationship between membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging actions. To begin with, we conduct a trend analysis examining the thesis that—in post-industrial societies—levels of elite-challenging action are rising at the expense of associational life. Next, we will perform individual-level analyses of data on a global scope of countries, testing whether desirable civic attitudes, such as tolerance, trust, and support of democratic norms, are more closely linked with association membership, or with participation in elite-challenging action. Finally, we will move to societal-level analyses, testing whether high levels of association membership or high levels of elite-challenging action are more beneficial in strengthening democratic institutions.²

Data and Measurement

This study aims at *general* patterns, analyzing in how far membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging actions bring civic benefits that are universal over space and time. To tackle this question, we need data covering the broadest possible range of societies over the longest available period of time. The European and World Value Surveys (henceforth: Value Surveys) provide data of the broadest spatial and temporal scope.³ They cover societies across the full range of income levels, cultural zones and political regimes, including more than 70 societies that represent 80% of the world's population. Moreover, some of these societies have been surveyed over a period of 20 years from around 1980 to 2000, providing a considerable time-series.

To allow for time-series analyses, our measure of association membership covers only associations for which membership was asked in all four rounds of the Value

Surveys. These include ‘social services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people’ (henceforth: charity associations), ‘conservation, environment, animal rights groups’ (henceforth: environmental associations), and ‘education, music, arts or cultural activities’ (henceforth: cultural associations) as well as ‘professional associations’, ‘labour unions’, ‘political parties or groups’ and ‘religious or church organizations’.⁴ We coded membership for each association as ‘1’ against non-membership which is coded ‘0’. To reduce complexity, we group several associations into broader categories. Factor analyses indicate that memberships in charity, environmental and cultural associations form one cluster, while memberships in professional associations, labour unions and political parties form another cluster. These clusters overlap. But the probability of overlapping membership is larger among professional associations, labour unions and political parties, on one hand, and charity, environmental and cultural associations, on the other hand.⁵

This distinction is not only statistically significant. It also makes theoretical sense. Professional associations, labour unions and political parties aim at *partial* goods that are group-specific: they chiefly benefit the partisans of the given organizations. Charity, environmental and cultural associations, by contrast, aim at *public* goods that are beneficial to all community members. These associations do not simply represent a specific group interest; they champion issues of wider concern, such as health care, environmental protection and the society’s cultural richness. Hence, the two types of associations tend to reflect the difference between representing utilitarian group interests and general sociotropic ideals. Other authors (Rossteutscher & van Deth, 2002; Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2003) use a similar distinction, separating ‘Olson-groups’ (which we label ‘utilitarian associations’) and ‘Putnam-groups’ (‘sociotropic associations’ in our terms).

Based on these categorizations, we construct two types of variables. The first one adds an individual’s memberships in each association within the two categories. This generates variables with scores ranging from 0 to 3 for both sociotropic and utilitarian associations.⁶ The second type of variable indicates whether an individual is a member of *any* of the three sorts of associations in the respective category (1: yes; 0: no). These variables are aggregated to measure national percentages of people who are members of sociotropic or utilitarian associations.

To measure participation in elite-challenging actions we use responses indicating whether people have already participated in a petition, demonstration, boycott, unofficial strike or occupation of buildings.⁷ Among these activities, strikes and occupying buildings are distinctive in three ways. First, they are more radical and sometimes violent (which eliminates them from our focus on non-violent activities). Second, mass participation in these actions is minuscule and much less common than participation in the other activities. Third, participation in strikes and occupying buildings is much weaker correlated to the other activities than they are correlated among each other. Hence, we keep strikes and occupying buildings as a separate category. By contrast, we summarize participation in demonstrations, boycotts, and petitions to create a category of non-violent mass activities. Again, we constructed two types of variables. The first indicates in how many of the three sorts of non-violent actions an individual had participated (from 0 to 3). The second variable indicates whether an individual had participated in any of these three sorts of actions or not. The latter variable is aggregated to indicate the percentage of people who participated in non-violent actions, at the national level.⁸

Trend Analyses

Our trend analyses are restricted to 12 post-industrial democracies, for which the Value Surveys provide data across the 20 years from about 1980 to about 2000. We limit the trend analyses to post-industrial societies because the thesis that rising ‘de-institutionalized’ actions go along with a decline in membership of voluntary associations has been claimed for the post-industrial world only. The trend analyses include: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West), Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and the US.

Averaged over these post-industrial societies, Figure 1 plots the percentage of respondents reporting in the 1980, 1990 and 2000 rounds of the Value Surveys that they were members of (1) sociotropic associations (i.e., charity, environmental or cultural associations); (2) utilitarian associations (i.e., professional associations, labour unions or political parties); (3) religious or church organizations; and (4) in any of these associations. In an analogous way, Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents reporting participation in (1) petitions; (2) demonstrations or boycotts; (3) strikes or occupying buildings; and (4) a combination of (1) and (2).




Figure 1. The development of membership in associations in 12 post-industrial societies




Figure 2. The development of elite-challenging activities in 12 post-industrial societies

The evidence shown in Figures 1 and 2 confirms recent findings. As noted by Roller and Wessels (1996), Newton (2001) and Norris (2002, chapter 9), there is no general decline in membership in associations throughout post-industrial societies. For one, membership in labour unions, political parties, professional associations and in religious or church organizations has been stagnant or declining in most post-industrial societies. But membership in sociotropic associations has been increasing, and the increase has been large enough to offset the declining or stagnant trend in other associations. Of course, the pattern varies from country to country. But there is no *general* decline of membership in voluntary associations throughout the post-industrial world. Rather, membership seems to have shifted from utilitarian to sociotropic associations. This does not indicate a universal erosion of social capital.

With participation in elite-challenging action, the picture is more uniform. Participation increased in all types of action, although the increase is minuscule with regard to unofficial strikes and occupying buildings. Overall, mass participation in elite-challenging action increased substantially throughout post-industrial societies over the past 20 years, rising from 56 to 70% on average. This result corroborates recent findings by Inglehart and Welzel (2005): post-industrial mass publics have become more self-assertive against official authorities.

We do not observe a general decline in association membership across post-industrial democracies—despite a clear increase in elite-challenging action, which has been supposed to be a reason for falling membership rates. In fact, the rise in elite-challenging action is accompanied by rising membership in sociotropic associations.

Figure 3 differentiates participation in the non-violent types of elite-challenging action and membership in sociotropic associations for nine successive birth cohorts. In addition, participation and membership rates are shown for two different time points, 1980 and 2000.

The generational differences indicate a life-cyclical pattern. Involvement tends to be lower among the oldest and the youngest cohorts. This pattern reflects that people tend to be most intensively involved in community life in the middle of their life-cycle, as life course studies have repeatedly shown. But more significant than this is the *increase* in community involvement over time that is manifest across all cohorts, in particular the younger ones. People below 25 years of age show more community involvement in 2000 than people of the same age in 1980. This holds true for membership in sociotropic associations and participation in elite-challenging action. The post-industrial world experiences neither a decline of community involvement in general nor a specific decline among the younger adults.




Figure 3. Cohortwise development of community involvement in 12 post-industrial societies

Individual-level Analyses

The increase in elite-challenging action has not grown at the expense of membership in sociotropic associations—at the aggregate level. Yet, it is possible that the individual-level relationship between association membership and participation in elite-challenging action differs from this pattern, especially in societies that are distinct from the post-industrial world. Moreover, it is possible that the two forms of community involvement are oppositely related to desirable civic attitudes at the individual level, such as interest in public life, trust, tolerance and support of democratic norms.

The Value Surveys provide individual-level evidence of a broad array of societies from around the world, reaching far beyond the post-industrial societies we have just analyzed. Following Inglehart and Welzel (2005), we categorize these societies into five groups:

1. Post-industrial societies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany (West), Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the US.
2. Developing societies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.
3. ‘Western’ ex-Communist societies: Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany (East), Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
4. ‘Eastern’ ex-Communist societies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, Ukraine.
5. Low-income societies: Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

Based on this classification, we examine six types of correlates of community involvement that have been analyzed in previous studies of mass participation (among others, see Almond & Verba, 1963; Verba *et al.*, 1978, 1995; Barnes *et al.*, 1979; Jennings & van Deth, 1989; Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2002). The first category covers socio-demographic characteristics, including sex, size of residential area, level of education and income level.⁹ From a civic perspective it is rather undesirable that these characteristics are strongly correlated with community involvement. For this would indicate unequal opportunities for people from different social background to take part in public life.

The second category of correlates relates the two forms of community involvement to each other, testing the widely held thesis that individuals who seek for the ‘thrilling excitement’ in elite-challenging actions dislike the ‘boring routines’ of voluntary associations (and vice versa). Should such a trade-off exist, one would find a negative individual-level correlation between the two kinds of community involvement.

The third category covers people’s psychological involvement into community life, such as how regularly they follow news and how often they discuss politics with friends. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that active involvement into community life is linked with high levels of attention to public life. This is rather desirable from a civic perspective, showing that participation is at least partly driven by people’s intrinsic interest and involves more informed people.

Communitarians argue that conformity to a society's institutions, elites and norms is a healthy civic attitude that favors involvement in voluntary associations and prevents people from disturbing mass actions. Conservatives add that religiousness is helpful in this context because it strengthens people's loyalty to their communities. All this is of course debatable. Conformity to institutions, elites and norms may imply an uncritical acceptance of repressive and corrupt practices—the very contradiction of civic governance. Likewise, religiousness may involve dogmatic rigidity—the contradiction of civic-mindedness. Despite this ambiguity, we will look whether there is a systematic connection between community involvement and conformist attitudes and religiousness.

The fifth category of correlates includes such orientations as trust in other people, tolerance of outgroups, support for democracy, liberty aspirations and a more general emphasis on human self-expression and well-being integrating several of these orientations (namely trust, tolerance, liberty aspirations and life satisfaction).¹⁰ These are humanistic orientations emphasizing the liberty, well-being and value of human beings in general. Throughout the literature, humanistic orientations are viewed as the very essence of civic-mindedness. Hence, it is most interesting to see whether membership in sociotropic associations or participation in elite-challenging actions are more closely linked to this set of undoubtedly civic attitudes.

A sixth category of correlates includes a given nation's central tendency in community involvement. We assume that a society's general level of community involvement determines each individual's opportunities to become involved itself. For people living in societies with a higher level of community involvement are exposed to more opportunities to participate. Thus, we test the extent to which an individual's involvement is context-shaped, reflecting its exposure to other people's involvement.¹¹

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate how membership in sociotropic associations (Table 1) and participation in elite-challenging action (Table 2) correlate with these variables. Since we are interested in generalization, our analyses focus on the patterns that are consistent throughout all five types of society (highlighting the differences deserves another paper).

Both membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging action correlate positively with size of town and levels of education and income. This is not surprising. Community involvement requires resources, skills and opportunities, which are more abundant among better educated and more prosperous people in more urban areas. It is noteworthy that this is even more true for elite-challenging activity, which is often misunderstood as being driven by the misery and alienation of deprived groups.¹² Most importantly, however, the correlations with socio-demographic characteristics are rather weak for both forms of community involvement. The social bias toward more capable social groups is modest.

Looking at other forms of community involvement, membership in sociotropic associations is rather strongly correlated with membership in religious or church organizations, while participation in elite-challenging action is positively but weakly linked with it. Moreover, both membership in sociotropic associations and participation in elite-challenging action are strongly linked with membership in utilitarian associations. Most importantly, membership in sociotropic associations and participation in elite-challenging action are positively correlated *with each other*—and this holds true in each type of society. The correlation is modest but significant, contradicting the supposition that individuals who participate in 'turbulent' actions are less likely to be members of 'orderly' associations. The contrary is true, although the tendency is not very strong.

Table 1. Correlates of individual-level membership in sociotropic associations (added over three types of associations)

Correlates:	Post-industrial societies	Developing societies	Western ex-Communist societies	Eastern ex-Communist societies	Low-income societies	Pooled data
<i>Socio-demographic factors:</i>						
Sex (1: female; 0: male)	.03	.02	n.s.	n.s.	-.08	n.s.
Town size	.05	-.04	.04	n.s.	-.11	.03
Education level	.16	.18	.09	.06	.16	.11
Income level	.13	.12	.06	.08	.08	.10
<i>Other community involvement:</i>						
Member religious organization	.23	.17	.12	.18	.26	.23
Member utilitarian association	.23	.24	.12	.14	.38	.22
Elite-challenging action	.20	.11	.12	.09	.08	.17
<i>Interest in public life:</i>						
Watch TV	.18	.06	—	.03	-.05	.04
Follow news	.08	.07	.04	n.s.	.12	.05
Discuss politics	.17	.11	.09	.06	.17	.12
<i>Conformist orientations:</i>						
Institutional confidence	.04	.04	n.s.	.03	.09	.07
Elite confidence	.08	n.s.	—	n.s.	.06	.01
Norm obedience	.03	n.s.	n.s.	-.05	n.s.	.01
Religiosity	.03	-.02	-.02	-.02	n.s.	.02
<i>Humanistic orientations:</i>						
Trust in people	.14	.05	.07	.05	-.05	.10
Tolerance of homosexuality	.16	.06	.09	.03	-.03	.11
Liberty aspirations	.12	.03	.07	.04	.05	.08
Emphasis on human self-expression	.17	.08	.09	.07	-.03	.10
Support for democracy	.06	.03	.06	.08	.04	.07
<i>Central tendency:</i>						
National membership level	.27	.12	.16	.21	.29	.27
Number of cases	5277 to 52 922	3794 to 16 481	8104 to 11 713	6204 to 17 447	11 805 to 14 888	27 080 to 122 415

Source: Value Surveys II (1989–1991) and IV (1999–2001). Entries are Spearman correlations (rho). If not indicated otherwise (n.s. = not significant), all correlations are significant at the .01-level. For variable specifications see Internet Appendix at <http://imperia.iu-bremen.de/hss/cwelzel> (under ‘Appendices’).

Considering people’s attention to public life, both membership in sociotropic associations and participation in elite-challenging action correlate with people’s interest in the news and their inclination to discuss politics. However, the correlations are considerably stronger with participation in elite-challenging action—in every type of society. In this respect, participation in elite-challenging action is more strongly linked with a desirable civic attitude—interest in public life—than is true of membership in associations.

Consistently, conformist orientations show a weakly positive linkage with membership in sociotropic associations and a weakly negative linkage with participation in elite-challenging

Table 2. Correlates of individual-level participation in elite-challenging action (added over three forms of action)

Correlates:	Post-industrial societies	Developing societies	Western ex-Communist societies	Eastern ex-Communist societies	Low-income societies	Pooled data
<i>Socio-demographic factors:</i>						
Sex (1: female; 0: male)	-.07	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14	-.07
Town size	.11	n.s.	.16	.12	.06	.07
Education level	.22	.16	.18	.12	.10	.17
Income level	.18	.12	.10	.10	.05	.15
<i>Other community involvement:</i>						
Member religious organization	.08	.03	.03	.02	.04	.05
Member utilitarian association	.23	.22	.18	.21	.18	.22
Member sociotropic association	.21	.12	.13	.10	.10	.17
<i>Interest in public life:</i>						
Watch TV	.21	.06	—	.10	.04	.13
Follow news	.13	.14	.16	.13	.16	.14
Discuss politics	.27	.27	.26	.19	.24	.24
<i>Conformist orientations:</i>						
Confidence in institutions	-.03	-.07	-.09	-.04	-.03	-.03
Elite confidence	n.s.	n.s.	—	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Norm obedience	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05	.03	-.02
Religiosity	-.12	-.16	-.18	-.07	-.09	-.19
<i>Humanistic orientations:</i>						
Trust in people	.15	.07	.10	.04	.02	.13
Tolerance of homosexuality	.25	.07	.25	.06	n.s.	.26
Liberty aspirations	.22	.12	.23	.11	.07	.21
Emphasis on human self-expression	.27	.12	.28	.12	.05	.25
Support for democracy	.19	.15	.17	.09	.06	.23
<i>Central tendency:</i>						
National activity level	.27	.26	.42	.15	.26	.39
Number of cases	5277 to 48 946	3794 to 22 488	8104 to 11 723	6204 to 16 712	17 669 to 25 224	32 944 to 134 360

Source: Value Surveys II (1989–1991) and IV (1999–2001). Entries are Spearman correlations (ρ). If not indicated otherwise (n.s. = not significant), all correlations are significant at the .01-level. For variable specifications see Internet Appendix at <http://imperia.iu-bremen.de/hss/cwelzel> (under ‘Appendices’).

action (the latter correlates more strongly negative with religiousness, however). But the meaning of conformist attitudes is ambiguous: people could be too defiant to authorities because of lack of conformity or they can be too obedient because of too much conformity. This leaves it unclear whether the negative and positive correlations with conformist attitudes point to a higher civic quality of association membership or elite-challenging action. Anyway, these correlations are weak, not allowing for gross generalizations.

The correlations are more conclusive with regard to humanistic orientations—the civically most desirable attitudes. Tolerance, support for democracy and an emphasis

on human self-expression all are positively linked with both forms of community involvement. But the linkage with participation in elite-challenging action is considerably stronger. Here we have the most conclusive evidence, showing that participation in elite-challenging action is more closely linked with desirable civic attitudes than is true of membership in voluntary associations. Once more, this pattern is consistent throughout all five types of societies.

Finally, a very different attribute shows by far the strongest correlation with both forms of community involvement: a given nation's mean level of community involvement.¹³ This indicates that an individual's involvement in the community is only partly a matter of this individual's personal attributes. It is strongly conditioned by the amount of opportunities to which individuals are exposed (which is reflected in a given population's overall level of activity). An individual's community involvement is more a context shaped phenomenon than a personality trait.

Table 3 uses some of the strongest correlates from Tables 1 and 2 as predictors in logistic regressions in which membership in sociotropic associations and participation in elite-challenging action, respectively, are the dependent variables. The results confirm the correlation analyses in Tables 1 and 2. Indicators of the most desirable civic attitudes—interest in politics and an emphasis on human self-expression—have more predictive power for participation in elite-challenging action than for membership in sociotropic associations (compare Models 1–1 and 2–1). Further, both forms of community involvement reflect above all contextual opportunities of involvement: the individuals' involvement is most strongly determined by the overall involvement level of their population. This can be seen from the fact that the explained variance in both membership in associations and participation in elite-challenging action roughly doubles when the sample mean of the dependent variable is included among the predictors (Models 1–2 and 2–2).¹⁴ Doing this means to control all remaining effects for the between-nation variance in the dependent variable. Accordingly, Models 1–2 and 2–2 show for each predictor only its effect on the *within*-nation variation in the dependent variable, that is, a *genuinely* individual-level effect that persists once all between-nation variance is counted out. Under this control, political interest and an emphasis on human self-expression keep showing a stronger or at least an equally strong effect on participation in elite-challenging action as on membership in voluntary associations. On the other hand, education shows now an equally strong effect on membership in associations and on elite-challenging action, correcting the pattern that the bivariate correlations have shown (where the linkage with elite-challenging was stronger). Thus, controlling for various other influences, elite-challenging action is socially not more biased than membership in associations.

Inspired by these findings we have used a multi-level model to analyze the effect of self-expression values on participation in elite-challenging action. This effect is generally positive at the individual level but its strength varies considerably from one national population to the next. Technically speaking, this means that a Level 1 effect varies across Level 2 units. This is evident from the fact that the Level 1 effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging action varies nationwide both in terms of intercepts and slopes (see the random intercepts and slopes components in Table 4). This nationwide variation of the Level 1 effect deserves itself an explanation. For this purpose one needs a Level 2 model in which the size of the Level 1 effect is the dependent variable, using Level 2 predictors to explain its variance. More concretely, we use national

Table 3. Influences on individual-level community involvement (logistic regression)

Predictors:	Dependent variable:			
	Membership in any of three types of sociotropic associations (0: no; 1: yes)		Participation in any of three forms of elite-challenging action (0: no; 1: yes)	
	Model 1-1	Model 1-2	Model 2-1	Model 2-2
<i>Socio-demographic factors:</i>				
Education level:				
Reference: no formal education				
Primary level education	1.0 (.02)	1.1* (.09)	1.2*** (.17)	1.2*** (.21)
Secondary level education	1.5*** (.33)	1.4*** (.31)	1.4* (.33)	1.6*** (.45)
Tertiary level education	2.1*** (.75)	1.9*** (.63)	1.5*** (.41)	2.0*** (.68)
<i>Other community involvement:</i>				
Member/participant:				
Reference: no member/participant				
Member/participant in one assoc./activity	1.4*** (.33)	1.2*** (.20)	1.6*** (.47)	1.4*** (.37)
Member/participant in two assoc./activities	1.7*** (.51)	1.5*** (.40)	1.8*** (.61)	1.7*** (.51)
Member/participant in three assoc./activities	2.0*** (.69)	1.8*** (.56)	1.3*** (.27)	1.3*** (.24)
<i>Interest in public life:</i>				
Discuss politics:				
Reference: never discuss politics				
Occasionally discuss politics	1.2*** (.17)	1.3*** (.24)	1.9*** (.64)	1.8*** (.56)
Frequently discuss politics	1.4*** (.36)	1.7*** (.51)	3.3*** (1.2)	3.1*** (1.1)
<i>Humanistic orientations:</i>				
Emphasis on human self-expression:				
Reference: emphasis on no component				
Emphasis on one component	1.2*** (.19)	1.2*** (.17)	1.3*** (.25)	1.1* (.09)
Emphasis on two components	1.4*** (.34)	1.3*** (.27)	2.0*** (.68)	1.3*** (.27)
Emphasis on three components	1.8*** (.58)	1.5*** (.42)	3.5*** (1.3)	1.7*** (.54)
Emphasis on four components	2.6*** (.95)	2.0*** (.72)	6.2*** (1.8)	2.2*** (.79)
<i>Central tendency:</i>				
Nation level of dependent variable	—	24.4*** (3.2)	—	14.7*** (2.6)
Nagelkerke R ² (Cox & Snell)	.07 (.05)	.25 (.17)	.14 (.10)	.27 (.20)
N (individuals)	89 940 (150 631 missing)			

Source: Value Surveys II to IV (1989–2001). Entries are odds ratios with beta coefficients in parentheses. Significance levels: ^{n.s.} $p \geq .10$; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

properties, such as a country’s level of human resources, to explain cross-national variation in the individual-level effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging activity.

We use a combined indicator of economic, cognitive and social resources taken from Vanhanen (1997) as a predictor because ‘resource-mobilization’ theory suggests that mobilizing people for collective action requires various human resources. Hence, one would expect that the Level 1 effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging action becomes stronger with more abundant resources at Level 2.¹⁵ And indeed, our first Level 2 model shows that the magnitude of this effect increases significantly with more abundant

Table 4. The effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging action in a multi-level model

Level 1 Model (pooled individual-level data)	
Predictor	Dependent variable: Sum of elite-challenging activities (0-to-3 scale)
Emphasis on human self-expression	.27*** (123.6)
Variance components (sum of squares):	
Explained:	
Fixed effect	10273.2 (6.0%)
Random intercepts	8670.9 (5.0%)
Random slopes	9511.2 (5.6%)
Unexplained	142248.2
N	192 778

Note: Entries are standardized beta-coefficients (T-ratios in parentheses).

Source: Value Surveys II–IV (1989–2001).

Level 2 Models (nation level data)			
Predictors:	Dependent variable: Size of level-1 effect across national samples (slopes of unstandardized regression coefficients)		
Human Resources ca. 1993	.81*** (11.57)		.69*** (6.88)
Democratic Freedom 1995		.66*** (7.47)	.16 (1.57)
Adj. R ²	.65	.43	.65
N	74	74	74

Note: Entries are standardized beta-coefficients (T-ratios in parentheses).

Source: Value Surveys; World Bank; Freedom House.

human resources,¹⁶ which explain 65% of the effect-size variance across 74 nations. Likewise, theories of ‘political opportunity structure’ suggest that legal opportunities for specific activities are crucial in explaining participation in these activities. Accordingly, one would assume that the effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging actions increases as the scope of democratic freedom widens (because more freedom reflects more permissive opportunities for these actions). Using the Freedom House scores as an indicator of democratic opportunities, this is indeed the case, with 43% of the variation in the effect size being explained by variation in democratic freedom. However, when we include both the human resources index and the Freedom House scores, the former shows a considerably stronger effect, whereas the latter becomes even insignificant. Thus, democratic opportunities strengthen the effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging action only insofar as these opportunities are linked with more abundant resources. Vice versa, more abundant resources strengthen the effect of self-expression values on elite-challenging action even when democratic opportunities are lacking. In fact, elite-challenging actions that are driven by mass emphasis on political self-expression can be a road to enforce democratization, as many Third Wave transitions have shown (examples include Argentina, the Philippines, South Korea or Czechoslovakia).

These insights lead us to the crux of our examination. Ultimately, whether membership in associations or participation in elite-challenging action has the greater civic payoff in strengthening open, accountable and democratic institutions can only be tested at the societal level—because democratic institutions exist only at this level.

Societal-level Analyses

Table 5 shows correlations between aggregate measures of membership in associations and elite-challenging action taken from around 1995, and various measures of open, accountable and efficient ways of governance, or ‘civic’ governance, taken from 2002. Most indicators are provided by the World Bank based on factor analyses on data from more than 20 different sources, such as Transparency International, Freedom House, Global Access and others.¹⁷ Using these indicators, various dimensions such as ‘voice and accountability’ or ‘regulatory quality’ are extracted and validated in dimensional analyses (for details, see Kaufman *et al.*, 2003).

The results in Table 5 could hardly be clearer. A society’s level of membership in sociotropic associations is very weakly and always insignificantly related to measures of the civic quality of governance. The same applies to membership in utilitarian associations. In sharp contrast, levels of elite-challenging action are strongly and significantly correlated to all these measures. This holds true across a global sample of more than 70 nations, including post-industrial democracies, developing societies, ex-Communist societies and low-income societies. These findings seem to indicate that elite-challenging actions bring greater civic benefits than does membership in associations—despite the scholarly emphasis on associational life and its disregard of elite-challenging action.

Table 5. National-level linkages with good governance indicators: associational membership vs. elite-challenging action Pearson correlations (N)

	Percentage of members in any of three types of utilitarian associations around 1995	Percentage of members in any of three types of sociotropic associations around 1995	Percentage of participants in any of three types of elite-challenging actions around 1995
Civil and political rights 2002 (Freedom House)	.01 ^{n.s.} (68)	.06 ^{n.s.} (70)	.67*** (75)
Voice and accountability 2002 (World Bank)	.01 ^{n.s.} (67)	.02 ^{n.s.} (69)	.78*** (74)
Political stability 2002 (World Bank)	.09 ^{n.s.} (67)	.03 ^{n.s.} (69)	.62** (74)
Government effectiveness 2002 (World Bank)	.02 ^{n.s.} (67)	.04 ^{n.s.} (69)	.74*** (74)
Regulatory quality 2002 (World Bank)	.01 ^{n.s.} (67)	.02 ^{n.s.} (69)	.71*** (74)
Rule of law 2002 (World Bank)	.02 ^{n.s.} (67)	.02 ^{n.s.} (69)	.71*** (74)
Gender empowerment 2000 (UNDP)	.19* (51)	.06 ^{n.s.} (70)	.66*** (54)

Source: Aggregated data from earliest available round of Value Surveys II (1989–1991), III (1995–1997), and IV (1999–2001), such that mean year of measurement is in 1995. World Bank good governance indicators; Freedom House civil liberties and political rights scores; United Nations Development Program scores for gender empowerment.

Significance levels: ^{n.s.} $p \geq .10$; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Perhaps the best indicator of a civically governed society is the openness and responsiveness of its institutions, labeled ‘voice and accountability’ by the World Bank. Table 5 shows a .78 correlation between ‘voice and accountability’ and mass participation in elite-challenging actions (significant at the .000-level). However, the causal relation between elite-challenging actions, on one hand, and open and accountable institutions, on the other, may differ from our interpretation. Perhaps, more people participate in elite-challenging actions *because* a society has more open and accountable institutions, making it less risky to participate in these actions. This and other possibilities are tested in Table 6, using multiple regression analyses.

Taking the duration of a society’s democratic tradition into account diminishes the effect of elite-challenging action on open and accountable institutions (compare Models 1 and 2). This is so because the level of elite-challenging action partly reflects the persistence of democracy. But this is only *partly* true. The impact of elite-challenging action remains significant and reasonably strong, even when we control for how long a society has been democratic. Accordingly, the effect of elite-challenging action on open and accountable institutions does not only reflect the fact that the respective countries were already democratic when the level of elite-challenging action was measured. Elite-challenging action has also an independent effect on open and accountable institutions. In fact, elite-challenging actions have helped topple authoritarian regimes where democracy was not yet established; and they help keeping elites responsive to mass demands in countries where democracy has already been in place for many years.¹⁸

Interestingly, the effect of elite-challenging action becomes most seriously diminished when we control for the proportion of people in a society who emphasize human

Table 6. Explaining democratic governance by people’s community involvement: beta-coefficients (T-values)

<i>Predictors:</i>	Dependent variable: open and accountable governance 2002			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percentage of participants in elite-challenging action around 1995	.71*** (7.99)	.54*** (4.72)	.34** (3.31)	n.s
Percentage of members in sociotropic associations around 1995	n.s	—	—	—
Number of years under democracy up to 1995		.26** (2.30)	n.s	—
Percentage of people emphasizing human self-expression 1995			.60*** (5.52)	.17** (2.21)
Lagged dependent variable 1996				.73*** (9.25)
Adjusted R ²	.48	.56	.69	.87
N	67	73	68	69

Source: Aggregated data from earliest available round of Value Surveys II (1989–91), III (1995–97) and IV (1999–2001), such that mean year of measurement is in 1995. Polity IV project and World Bank good governance indicators.

Note: — = Effect deselected because of insignificance in previous model.

self-expression (Model 3). This confirms recent findings by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) showing that elite-challenging actions are relevant to democratic institutions mainly insofar as they are coupled with self-expression values. Accordingly, the impact of elite-challenging action on democratic institutions is relatively weak when we isolate it from self-expression values.

The impact of self-expression values on open and accountable institutions seems to be causal in the true sense. It does not break down even when we control for the lagged dependent variable, that is, a prior measure of open and accountable institutions (Model 4). Accordingly, the impact of self-expression values on open and accountable institutions is ‘Granger-causal’ (Granger, 1969).¹⁹ For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 depicts the zero-order effect of self-expression values on open and accountable institutions.

Summing Up

Trend analyses show no trade-off between membership in civic types of voluntary associations and participation in civic forms of elite-challenging action. Throughout post-industrial societies both forms of community involvement have been increasing from 1980 to 2000, although the increase in elite-challenging action has been more pronounced.




Figure 4. Self-expression values and civic governance

At the individual-level, too, there is no trade-off between membership in civic associations and participation in elite-challenging action. Instead, both forms of community involvement are positively correlated with each other—in all types of society. But this linkage is modest, and membership in voluntary associations and participation in elite-challenging action are distinct enough to have different correlates. These differences do *not* support the widespread assumption that membership in voluntary associations is more closely linked with desirable civic attitudes, such as political interest, support of democratic ideals, and humanistic orientations, than is participation in elite-challenging action. In fact, participation in elite-challenging action is more closely linked with aspects of civic-mindedness than is association membership.

Differences between the two forms of community involvement are most evident at the societal level. Aggregate measures of elite-challenging action show much stronger linkages with any measure of ‘good governance’ than do aggregate measures of association membership. These findings suggest that the scholarly literature on social capital has over-emphasized the civic benefits of association membership—and underestimated the beneficial pressures of elite-challenging action.

The impact of elite-challenging action reflects the emancipative thrust of the values that motivate these actions: self-expression values. It is the *values* to which an activity is tied, not the activity *as such*, that makes a society civic. For it is the values that determine to which ends given actions are directed. Collective actions invariably reflect social capital. But the values motivating these actions decide whether people make civic or uncivic uses of their social capital. Only civic values can direct collective actions into a civic direction. And much of what makes values civic lies in their emancipative thrust.

Conclusion—Bringing Emancipative Aspects into the Theory of Social Capital

Most theories define social capital by its capacity to translate community ties into collective action. Thus, social capital involves three distinct facets: ties, actions and something translating ties into actions. As shown in Figure 5, these three facets can be used to differentiate social capital into (1) what it needs; (2) what it is; and (3) what it does.

To begin with, social capital needs a communal basis on which it can operate. This basis consists of all possible sorts of community ties, including networks of interpersonal contacts as well as psychological ties to the community, such as group identities and territorial identities. These community ties make up the glue without which no society can exist and without which social capital cannot operate. But even though community ties are needed to let social capital operate, social capital is not identical to community ties. Instead, social capital as such comprises all factors that help *translate* given ties into collective action.

These ‘translators’ constitute social capital itself; and they include various things. To begin with, ‘resource-mobilization’ theory suggests that material and intellectual resources are needed to make people capable to translate their ties into collective action. Next, theories of ‘political opportunity structure’ argue that appropriate norms and institutions set positive incentives, encouraging people to use their ties for collective actions. Further, ‘transaction cost’ theories reason that various forms of trust lower the transaction costs that have to be invested when using ties to initiate collective actions. Finally, ‘value-expectancy’ theory suggests that adequate value orientations provide




Figure 5. A concept to distinguish various aspects of social capital

intrinsic motivators stimulating people to invest their ties into collective action. In summary, the three major types of ‘translators’ that constitute social capital itself consist of (1) resource-based capabilities; (2) institution-based incentives; and (3) value-based motivators.²⁰

Apart from what social capital needs and what it is, it is also defined by what it does: producing collective action. In that sense, the frequency and radius of collective action in a society measures the productivity of social capital, with more frequent and more widespread collective actions indicating more productive forms of social capital.

The study of social capital should be open to all types of community ties, all types of translators, and all types of collective actions. Based on this openness one can analyze which aspects and forms of social capital are most beneficial in their societal consequences. The civic question then is ‘Which forms and aspects of social capital contribute the most to the democratic quality and performance of institutions?’

Our study found some preliminary answers. Among the various translators that constitute social capital, self-expression values provide a particularly powerful motivator. These values are strikingly productive in nourishing elite-challenging actions. And coupled with self-expression values, these actions show significant civic consequences in strengthening democratic institutions.

Self-expression values and elite-challenging actions represent a specific form of social capital: a form that has a strong emancipative thrust. Social capital as such is always present in societies. What varies greatly yet, is the presence of emancipative forms of social capital. As it seems, the more of this emancipative social capital is present, the more accountable, responsive, and democratic is a society governed. This finding confirms the emphasis that human development theory places on the theme of emancipation (Welzel, 2002, 2003; Welzel *et al.*, 2003; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005). Future research should pay more attention to emancipative forms of social capital.

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Notes

1. One of the few exceptions is the study by Dekker *et al.* (1997). These authors analyze the empirical association between engagement in voluntary associations and protest participation. However, they do not specify the role of protest participation (what we call elite-challenging action) in a theory of social capital (but see Welzel, 1999).
2. There is an Internet Appendix available at <http://imperia.iu-bremen.de/hss/cwelzel> (see menu "Appendices"), providing details concerning variable construction, scaling and data sources used for our analyses.
3. For details of the questionnaire, fieldwork and available data sets visit the web site: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.
4. The Value Surveys ask: "Please, look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and say which, if any, do you belong to [*interviewer instruction: code all 'yes' answers as 1, if not mentioned code as 2*]".
5. 'Religious or church organizations' do not clearly fall into one of these clusters. So we keep them as a separate category.
6. We would have preferred to measure 'active' membership instead of membership in general. Unfortunately, because of inconsistencies in the question format, it is not possible to measure active membership in the same way over all rounds of the Value Surveys. But this is probably not too great a disadvantage because we know from studies that have been able to distinguish active and passive membership that the effects of both types of membership point in the same direction and that the more decisive dividing line is between membership and non-membership, not between active and passive membership (Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2003; van Deth, 2004, p. 311).
7. The Value Surveys ask: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances do it". Then the following actions are read out: "signing petitions", "joining in boycotts", "attending lawful demonstrations", "joining unofficial strikes", "occupying buildings or factories". Note that in most ex-Communist countries, the term 'lawful demonstrations' had been replaced by 'peaceful demonstrations'.
8. The fact that respondents are asked to indicate whether they had already participated at all (not asking for recent participation only) makes this measure insensitive to periodic protest cycles. Thus, at the aggregate-level we measure a country's general level of elite-challenging activities, independent of its current high or low in protest cycles.
9. See the Internet Appendix at <http://imperia.iu-bremen.de/hss/cwelzel> (under menu "Appendices") for how these and all other variables are measured.
10. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) include indicators of elite-challenging action (signing petitions to be precise) in their measure of emphasis on human self-expression (i.e., self-expression values). This makes it impossible to test whether other parts of this syndrome have an effect on elite-challenging action. Hence, we re-calculated self-expression values excluding the mass action component, in order to test whether the remaining elements of the self-expression values syndrome affect these actions. These remaining components include liberty aspirations, tolerance of homosexuality, trust in other people and an emphasis on subjective well-being reflected in life satisfaction. See Internet Appendix for details.
11. This is a test of the gravity effect of national units on their constituents, examining what part of the total individual-level variance in public activities is bound by the nations' overall activity levels.
12. This can be different for violent forms of collective action, such as riots, which might indeed be driven by misery and deprivation.
13. We also used regions within nations as units of aggregation. Although this multiplies the number of aggregate units by a factor 10, regional activity levels do not capture a larger part of the variance in individual-level activity than do national activity levels.

14. This might seem tautological because the national means are calculated from each individual of a national sample. But this tautology is minuscule because it equals the statistical contribution of any individual to the sample mean. In a sample of 1000 respondents the contribution of any individual amounts exactly to one thousandth. Put differently, for each individual the sample mean is composed to 99.9% by the contributions of *all other* individuals. Hence, the sample mean is almost entirely exogenous to the individuals from which it is aggregated. Tautology is therefore not a problem of this kind of analysis.
15. 'Becomes stronger' means that the slope of the regression line becomes steeper, which is reflected in a larger magnitude of the regression coefficient.
16. For a detailed description of the measure, see the Internet Appendix at <http://imperiu.u-bremen.de/hss/cwelzel>.
17. These indicators are based on expert judgments on categorical scales for the absence of corruption, press freedom, rule of law, civil liberties, political rights and many other 'soft' concepts. These measures are necessarily subjective but a great deal has been done to improve their inter-subjectivity by cross-validation through various means of dimensional analyses. These are the best available data on the civic quality of political institutions.
18. In ex-Communist societies, our measures of elite-challenging action are taken from the 1989–1991 round of the Value Surveys—at a time when most of these countries were in the beginning or just in the middle of the transition, partly because people went on the streets.
19. The concept of Granger-causality implies that the effect of an independent variable *X* on a dependent variable *Y* can be considered as causal insofar as this effect holds under controls for temporally prior measures of *Y*.
20. An important difference between institution-based incentives and value-based motivators is that incentives are *extrinsic* while values are *intrinsic* (i.e., internalized). There is abundant evidence from all kinds of behavioral research showing that intrinsic motivations are a more powerful regulator of human behavior than extrinsic incentives. Hence, we tend to see values as a more important aspect of social capital than institutions.

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